Honey,I shrunk the kids’ benefits—revisiting intergenerational conflict in OECD countries

Intergenerational conflict may arise when the interests of different age groups do not align. We examine cross-country data to find evidence for this conflict in OECD countries. We derive our results from a FGLS estimation model, which is complemented by a System-GMM estimation to account for potential endogeneity. The data are from a panel of 22 OECD countries over the time period 1985–2005. We find little support for intergenerational conflict in general; however, those who are close to statutory retirement age dislike public expenditure on families and education because, once they retire, they will have less income compared to their work income. This effect is transitory, however, implying a change in voting behavior during retirement age.     

Legislative Control of Powers Delegated to the Executive: The Case of the EU

How can legislators derive the benefits of delegation without unduly empowering the executive? This article investigates how this dilemma is met in the European Union (EU) political system where executive power is delegated to the Commission. The argument is that the European member states have found a unique solution. They install committees of member state representatives to monitor the EU Commission, the so‐called comitology committees. However, the extent to which comitology committees are installed and their exact competence vary considerably across policy areas. This article uses a delegation perspective to understand this variation. An analysis of comitology provisions in 686 directives and regulations shows that institutional conflict and issue complexity, well‐known factors from the delegation literature, are important predictors of comitology control of the Commission. The findings support one of the two prevailing images of comitology—comitology as a control mechanism, not deliberative democracy.     

Explaining Oversized Coalitions: Empirical Evidence from Local Governments

Government coalitions should be minimal winning. However, it is an empirical fact that oversized coalitions exist. Several theories have been offered to explain this phenomenon, but they are seldom put to a systematic empirical test. When empirical tests are performed, they are typically based on data on national government formations in post-war Europe. Since these are the data that gave rise to the theories in the first place, there is a risk of post hoc hypothesis reformulation. The purpose of this paper is to test explanations of oversized coalitions systematically in a new empirical setting and thus avoid this circularity problem. We focus on local governments in Denmark and have collected data by a survey sent to almost 3,000 local councillors. We draw hypotheses from three broad theoretical perspectives on oversized coalitions and test them in a logit regression analysis. The analysis shows that oversized coalitions cannot be explained by traditional coalition theories. Our results question the minimalist behavioural logic inherent in most coalition theories and suggest that parties may be motivated by norms.     

Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition?

Sweden is no longer a negative, exceptional case regarding the presence of radical right‐wing populist parties. The Sweden Democrats has continually grown stronger, and in 2010 they won seats in the Swedish parliament. However, their electoral support varies considerably across Sweden. This study analyses their electoral support in 290 Swedish municipalities in order to explain this variance. Support is found for the social marginality hypothesis: electoral support for the Sweden Democrats tends to be negatively correlated with the average level of education and with the Gross Regional Product per capita, and positively correlated with the unemployment rate. The ethnic competition hypothesis, that there is a positive correlation between the proportion of immigrants and electoral support of the Sweden Democrats, is also supported.     

How Lasting Is Voter Gratitude? An Analysis of the Short‐ and Long‐Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial Policy

Dominant theories of electoral behavior emphasize that voters myopically evaluate policy performance and that this shortsightedness may obstruct the welfare‐improving effect of democratic accountability. However, we know little about how long governments receive electoral credit for beneficial policies. We exploit the massive policy response to a major natural disaster, the 2002 Elbe flooding in Germany, to provide an upper bound for the short‐ and long‐term electoral returns to targeted policy benefits. We estimate that the flood response increased vote shares for the incumbent party by 7 percentage points in affected areas in the 2002 election. Twenty‐five percent of this short‐term reward carried over to the 2005 election before the gains vanished in the 2009 election. We conclude that, given favorable circumstances, policy makers can generate voter gratitude that persists longer than scholarship has acknowledged so far, and elaborate on the implications for theories of electoral behavior, democratic accountability, and public policy.     

Effect of different post-feeding intervals on the total time of development of the blowfly Lucilia sericata (Diptera: Calliphoridae)

By estimating the age of the immature stages of flies developing on a corpse, forensic entomologists are able to establish the minimum post-mortem interval. Blowflies, which are the first and most important colonizers, usually leave the cadaver at the end of the last larval stage searching for a pupation site. This period of development is referred as the post-feeding or wandering stage. The characteristics of the ground where the corpse was placed might be of notable importance for the post-feeding dispersal time: For pupariation the larvae prefer an environment protected from light and predators and may have a longer dispersal time in order to reach an appropriate pupation site. Hence, the dispersal time can vary and may influence the total time of development which may lead to an erroneous calculation of the post-mortem interval. This study investigates the effect of various post-feeding time intervals on the development of the blowfly Lucilia sericata at a temperature of 25°C. As larvae reached the post-feeding stage a pupariation substrate was offered at 0 and after 12, 24 and 48h. Only the larvae with a dispersal time of 24h (total time of development 325.2h; median) and 48h (total time of development 347.7h; median) showed a significantly longer total development time compared to the control group (total time of development 318.4h; median). The mortality rate did not differ between groups; however the flies that emerged from the group with a dispersal of 48h were significantly smaller indicating increased energy consumption during dispersal. The results of this study indicate that a prolonged post-feeding stage could increase the total developmental time of L. sericata which should be taken into consideration when interpreting entomological findings. The need for a serious examination of current rearing practices in forensic entomology laboratories is indicated because reference data sets for the time of development are usually produced by offering the post-feeding stage a substrate for pupariation immediately.