Shaping Political Preferences: Information Effects in Political-Administrative Systems

Information is at the heart of politics. However, since information is always sent by someone who is more or less powerful, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of information from the power of the sender. Drawing on a standard model of attitude formation, we argue that presenting information can affect preferences of politicians regardless of the power of the sender. We test this proposition in a survey experiment with 1205 Danish local politicians in which the experimental groups were presented with varying levels of cost information but where sender remained constant. The experiment shows that even in a setting where the information is not disclosed by a powerful sender, information may have a stronger impact on political preferences than other well-known determinants such as committee and party affiliation. Our findings speak to learning theories, knowledge perspectives and the literature on the determinants of politicians’ preferences.     

Dutch real estate search engine found to provide lawful deep linking to websites of realtors

In preliminary relief proceedings against the Dutch search enginezoekallehuizen.nl, the Dutch court turned down the claims ofthe Dutch association of real estate agents (NVM) that the provisionof deep links to its members' websites infringed the copyrightand database rights of those realtors, but found that the NVMinfringed competition law by asking its members to make it impossiblefor zoekallehuizen.nl to provide deep links to their websites.     

How to lend like mad and make a profit: A micro‐credit paradigm versus the start‐up fund in South Africa

In current debates about micro‐credit, joint‐liability schemes are often viewed as the only viable way to non‐collateralised lending, and are thus seen as almost synonymous with micro‐credit. This article reports about an alternative, non‐participatory approach to micro‐credit. Prompted by the apparent inability of group credit schemes to reign in lending costs, the article sets out the institutional requirements for cheap, ‘mass‐produced’ credit. It argues that such credit can be viable if mechanisms are in place enforcing the self‐selection of potential borrowers and self‐motivation of existing borrowers. The analysis of a ‘mass‐minimalist’ micro‐credit institution from South Africa supports the argument.     

Imprint of the ‘militant tendency’ on the labour party

Most assessments of the ‘Militant Tendency’ fail to appreciate its dual character: the way it combines revolutionary ideology and reformist practice. By over‐stressing one or the other, its real influence in the Labour Party cannot be established. Its role is best seen in its questioning ‐ in outlook and practice ‐ the ‘belief in legality’ of Labourism. It is the fact that the Tendency has chosen to follow one of the strategic possibilities inherent in the movement which has raised controversy about its role in the party and more generally in politics.     

Analysis of current account reversals via regime switching models

The analysis of sharp and persistent reductions of current account deficits, which can be characterized as the transition from an unsustainable to a more sustainable level of current account balance, relies often on ad hoc criteria for identification of reversal episodes. Within this paper, an empirical framework in terms of a regime switching approach is presented allowing simultaneous identification of current account reversal episodes and their determinants. Additionally, this approach is extended towards analysis of the impact of a reversal on the path of economic growth. Empirical investigation of a panel containing developing countries suggests a different timing of reversals compared to timing delivered by ad hoc criteria. However, several determinants of reversals discussed in the literature remain valid. Our estimates of costs implied by the occurrence of a current account reversal amount to a severe reduction of economic growth, where output costs are found to vary largely across countries.     

Long-term effects of the Moving to Opportunity residential mobility experiment on crime and delinquency

Objectives

Using data from a randomized experiment, to examine whether moving youth out of areas of concentrated poverty, where a disproportionate amount of crime occurs, prevents involvement in crime.

Methods

We draw on new administrative data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment. MTO families were randomized into an experimental group offered a housing voucher that could only be used to move to a low-poverty neighborhood, a Section 8 housing group offered a standard housing voucher, and a control group. This paper focuses on MTO youth ages 15–25 in 2001 (n = 4,643) and analyzes intention to treat effects on neighborhood characteristics and criminal behavior (number of violent- and property-crime arrests) through 10 years after randomization.

Results

We find the offer of a housing voucher generates large improvements in neighborhood conditions that attenuate over time and initially generates substantial reductions in violent-crime arrests and sizable increases in property-crime arrests for experimental group males. The crime effects attenuate over time along with differences in neighborhood conditions.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that criminal behavior is more strongly related to current neighborhood conditions (situational neighborhood effects) than to past neighborhood conditions (developmental neighborhood effects). The MTO design makes it difficult to determine which specific neighborhood characteristics are most important for criminal behavior. Our administrative data analyses could be affected by differences across areas in the likelihood that a crime results in an arrest.     

Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study

We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing and able to collude on low‐tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, successful political influence never materializes when the firm and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40% of societies with finitely repeated encounters. However, investments are not always profitable, and profit sharing between the firm and candidates depends on prominent equity norms. Our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few firms do actually attempt to influence policymaking.