When the figures just don't figure

Last year I received from Jean Pire (Gevers & Partners,Belgium) some data concerning the success rate of litigantsin Office for Harmonisation (OHIM) proceedings involving Communitytrade marks and applications. These figures, drawn from Gevers'database of Board of Appeal, Opposition Division and CancellationDivision decisions, provide food for thought. A curious statistic is the rate at which parties to OHIM proceedingsfail to comply     

Strength or weakness?

Doing the electronic rounds, at the tail end of 2007, was amuch-forwarded email circular concerning an article in the 7November issue of China Intellectual Property News by YongshunCheng. The author, a former senior judge and deputy directorof the Intellectual Property Division of the Beijing High People'sCourt, currently directs the Beijing Intellectual Property Institute. According to this circular the article, translated into English,argues that the proposed US patent reform bill     

Obviousness and IP: time to reconsider

On 6 February, the day this editorial was written, the UnitedKingdom Patent Office surprised members of the local intellectualproperty professions when it launched an unexpected discussionpaper, Consultation on the Inventive Step Requirement in UnitedKingdom Patent Law and Practice and sought informed responseby 31 May. On the assumption that the provisions of patent law are intendedto reflect a balance between the complementary     

Terrorism Watch Lists,Suspect Ranking and Decision-Making Biases

The large number of names on terrorism watch lists raises the problem of monitoring. Given the existing resource constraints and other logistical considerations, efficient and accurate ranking of individuals in terms of threat posed is of paramount importance. This process, however, may be impacted by reference points, diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion, and other aspects of the human decision-making process that introduce biases. This article explores the relevance of decision-making processes and biases to the specific task of ranking and monitoring individuals whose names have been placed on a terrorism watch list.     

Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.