WOLF'S MODEL: Government Failure and Public Sector Reform in Advanced Industrial Democracies

Many developed nations have embarked on public sector reform programs based on the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. This article seeks to evaluate the efficacy of NPM reform strategies as a means of dealing with the problem of “government failure” in public sector hierarchies by examining these strategies through the analytical prism provided by Wolf's theory of nonmarket failure. Drawing on the New Zealand experience, we explore the potential for NPM reform initiatives to mitigate the problems of nonmarket supply. Moreover, we examine how “autonomous policy leadership” and “advocacy coalition networks” can overcome the various obstacles to the successful implementation of reform strategies delineated by Wolf under his “conditions of nonmarket demand”. The article then focusses on the efficacy of NPM in removing, or at least reducing, the various forms of government failure identified in Wolf's taxonomic catalogue of nonmarket failure. We conclude by assessing some of the likely tradeoffs involved in the application of NPM reform programs.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

The United States Supreme Court and the death penalty since Furman: The settlement of basic issues

In 1972 the United States Supreme Court in Furman V. Georgia found that the death penalty as it was then being applied was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Furman provided few constitutional guidelines, but states reinacted their death penalty statutes.In 1976 the Court began to receive appeals from death sentences imposed under the reinacted statutes. In its decisions the Court began to establish guidelines. It found the death penalty was not per se cruel and unusual punishment. Before the death penalty can be imposed the court must take into consideration any mitigating circumstances and the case must be reviewed by the state supreme court. A mandatory death sentence is unconstitutional.Other issues including proportionality, due process and finality of judgment will be examined in the next segment of this study.     

One size does not fit all: Matching breadth of stakeholder participation to watershed group accomplishments

The role of the public in US policy making has shifted substantially during the past several decades. This shift is particularly evident in environmental policy, where collaboration among multiple stakeholders is on the rise. Much of the literature on collaborative environmental management emphasizes the need for widespread community involvement, especially from private citizens. Many proponents of collaboration have argued that broad inclusion can lead to better environmental solutions while also establishing legitimacy, building social capital, and overcoming conflicts. Yet such broad inclusion may be costly in terms of time, energy, and resources, and it may not yield the desired results. Thus, a key question is how the breadth of public involvement is linked to collaborative group accomplishments. This study, using watershed groups in Ohio, demonstrates several links between group membership and results. Groups with a broader array of participants tend to excel in watershed plan creation, identifying/prioritizing issues, and group development and maintenance. In addition, groups comprised of a relatively balanced mix of governmental and non-governmental participants are more likely to list planning/research and group development and maintenance results than are groups comprised primarily of non-governmental participants. In contrast, groups with a narrower membership and groups that are composed primarily of non-governmental participants may focus more on pressuring government for policy change.     

Optimal Policies and Socially Oriented Behavior: Some Problematic Effects of an Incentive Compatible Device

Mancur Olson was pivotalin identifying the formal structure ofcollective action and the problems ofachieving optimal social outcomes with it. Using experimental methods, an incentivecompatible device is introduced in a5-person prisoner's dilemma. Thearrangements reflect constructs of Harsanyiand Rawls designed to identify optimal andfair outcomes. The device moves groupstowards optimality but its removalnegatively affects subsequent behavior,compared to a control with no ICD. Thisspill-over problem seems to reflect aweakened connection between sociallyoriented values and behavior, suggestingthat ICD's may have unanticipated negativeexternalities.     

Measuring Disparity in Government Procurement: Problems with Using Census Data in Estimating Availability

The Supreme Court's ruling in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson (1989) has restricted the use of government procurement assistance programs for minorities and women without the prerequisite support of a disparity study. Recently, an increasing number of disparity studies have been rejected by the courts as "junk science" and the related programs have been ruled unconstitutional. A central issue in these cases has been the approach used to estimate the availability of minority and women firms. Data from the Economic Census are commonly used as the basis for these availability estimates. However, there are significant problems and limitations with the Census data relative to the Croson guideline that the availability of women and minority firms should reflect the number of qualified, willing, and able firms. Given the number and difficulty of the required adjustments to the Census data, it is unlikely that these data will provide availability estimates that are accurate enough to allow for valid statistical tests of an inference of discriminatory exclusion. If minimizing court challenges is a goal of the public administrator who is responsible for the program, then the recommendation here is that a primary source of availability data should be considered. Furthermore, the information system needed to support the women and minority assistance programs should be designed and installed prior to initiating the program.