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141.
This article investigates the responsiveness of the Parti socialiste towards specific social groups under the Hollande and Mitterrand presidencies. It thereby contributes to the discussion on the changing representativeness of social democratic parties in Western Europe. The study is based on a content analysis of the governments’ justifications for the annual budget. With this innovative approach it is possible to assess whether the responsiveness of a party persists at the governmental level. Through an inductive coding procedure, three categories of responsive justifications are discerned: inequality reduction, needs of specific social groups and general functioning of society. In line with its title, the article mainly focuses on the second category, identifying a shift from responsiveness to the low-income classes towards responsiveness to the middle classes. Furthermore, a corresponding transformation of the Parti socialiste is observed, from advocating expansive policies in the early 1980s to justifying restrictive policies today. 相似文献
142.
143.
This paper examines the influences of candidate perceptions on Germany’s spring 2016 Länder election results. It takes a comparative approach, using a modified Michigan model on the data collected simultaneously in three Länder (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt). It explains why the Green party was successful in Baden-Württemberg but not in the other Länder, the impact of the major candidates, and what distinguishes the influences of the current prime ministers running for these elections. Whereas Winfried Kretschmann’s (Green party, Baden-Württemberg) high impact on the election results was driven mainly by a warmth dimension (sympathy), Malu Dreyer (SPD, Rhineland-Palatinate) was viewed as being competent. Both candidates were assets to their parties and co-responsible for the results. In comparison, in Saxony-Anhalt, none of the candidates were as important to the outcomes of the electoral success. 相似文献
144.
Johannes Urpelainen 《International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics》2012,12(2):145-163
If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When
future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce
the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize
the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country’s bargaining power. Powerful countries
underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international
negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve
the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These
findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure
the necessary technology investments. 相似文献
145.
146.
This paper examines the consequences of a specific regulatory restriction on bids for dual class shares. Shares of different classes are often argued to have different prices because a premium will be paid to the superior voting shares in the case of a tender offer. This paper assumes a setup where regulations require that a tender offer pays the same relative premium to both classes of shares. In this setup, it is shown that both classes will sell at the same price as long as there is a strictly positive probability that either the current management is sufficiently strong or that a sufficiently strong rival will show up. Furthermore, under this weak condition the regulation is socially optimal in the sense that the management that provides the highest total firm value will be the management of the firm. Finally, the regulation is shown to favor (or protect) the holders of restricted voting shares and this is not necessarily at the expense of the holders of superior voting shares.The practical interest of this paper derives from the fact that some European countries have adopted different regulatory restrictions on bids for dual class shares. This has more or less occurred due to proposed EU Directives. The regulation examined in this paper applies to tender offers in Denmark. Empirical results on the voting premium in Denmark are shown to be consistent with the theoretical results in this paper. 相似文献
147.
148.
149.
What is the relationship between political institutions and air pollution generated by the power sector? Here we focus on the association between democracy and power generated from coal, the most polluting of all fossil fuels. Using a new dataset on coal‐fired power plants commissioned between 1980 and 2016 in 71 countries, we find that the relationship between democracy and coal varies according to the environmental Kuznets curve logic. Democratic political institutions at lower levels of economic development are correlated with increased commissioning of coal power plants, as governments seek to appeal to an electorate prioritizing economic growth and affordable energy access. As a country becomes richer, democracy comes to have a negative association with coal power, as clean air becomes a more salient issue for the public. 相似文献
150.
Sectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991–2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline‐diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations. 相似文献