Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

This article analyzes public and private law enforcement whenthe government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seekinggovernment seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The articleconcludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth,a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizinggovernment in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parkingviolations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes;(2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and neverworse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choicebetween competitive private enforcement and public enforcementdepends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense.     

Restoring accountability in pretrial release: the Philadelphia pretrial release supervision experiments

As drug arrests and jail overcrowding added pressure to increase pretrial release in localities during the 1980s and 1990s, the need to manage a larger and higher-risk pretrial population of defendants awaiting adjudication in the community became a high priority for justice agencies. In the late 1990s Philadelphia officials sought to discover the ingredients of a successful supervision strategy through four interlinked field experiments to provide an empirical basis for a major reform of the pretrial release system. The results of the linked randomized experiments question common assumptions about “supervision,” its impact and effectiveness, about the underlying nature of the noncompliant defendant, and deterrence implications. The study emphasizes the importance of interpreting the findings in the context of implementation of the policy reform. Findings suggest that facilitative notification strategies wield little influence on defendant behavior and that deterrent aims are undermined by the system's failure to deliver consequences for defendant noncompliance during pretrial release. The most significant contribution of the article is its illustration of a major evidence-based policy reform undertaken by a major court system.     

NETWORK REGULATION: THE MANY FACES OF ACCESS

Telecommunications regulation has experienced a fundamentalshift from rate regulation to increased reliance on compelledaccess, perhaps best exemplified by the Telecommunications Actof 1996's imposition of no fewer than four new access requirements.Unfortunately, each access requirement is governed by a separateset of rules for determining both the scope and the price ofaccess. The resulting ad hoc regime has created difficult definitionalproblems and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. In thisarticle we propose a system inspired by the discipline of mathematicsknown as graph theory that integrates all of the different formsof access into a single analytical framework. This system separatesdifferent access regimes into five categories: (1) retail access,(2) wholesale access, (3) interconnection access, (4) platformaccess, and (5) unbundled access. It also provides insightsinto how each type of access complicates the already difficultproblems of network configuration and management and introducesinefficient biases into decisions about network capacity anddesign. The approach we propose also provides insights intothe transaction cost implications of the different types ofaccess. Drawing on the Coasean theory of the firm, our approachexamines the tradeoffs between internal governance costs andthe external transaction costs of providing access to offera theory of network boundaries. This framework shows how accessregulation distorts networks' natural boundaries and providesa basis for evaluating whether private ordering through marketswould lead to more efficient network design.     

A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR CHURCH'S REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS ON COMPETITION

We discuss Professor Jeffrey Church's report to the EuropeanCommission in 2004 on the effects of vertical restraints andmergers. Although thorough and accurate, the report could bemisinterpreted by practitioners, as it does not emphasize thatmarket power is only a necessary condition for harm to competition,and that most vertical mergers that present the possibilityof competitive harm also present economic efficiencies thatare intrinsic to the integration.     

Proficiency testing (external quality assessment) of drug detection in oral fluid

Eighteen external quality assessment (proficiency testing) samples were prepared from client specimens collected with the Intercept^® oral fluid collection device and by spiking drug-free oral fluid. Samples were circulated in pairs at quarterly intervals to 13 UK and USA based laboratories for analysis by a panel of OraSure micro-plate Intercept^® enzyme immunoassay kits and hyphenated mass spectrophotometric techniques. During the survey, there was a single case of non-specificity in a false report for methadone. The major errors were of lack of sensitivity relative to the concentration thresholds specified for the immunoassays. The sensitivity for overall ‘present’/‘not found’ reports calculated as true positives/(true positives + false negatives) were for the amfetamine specific assay 50%, methyl-amfetamines 93%, barbiturates 64%, cannabinoids 73%, cocaine and metabolites 100%, benzodiazepines 69%, methadone 95%, opiates 79% (opiates excluding oxycodone 93%), phencyclidine 93% and human gamma-globulin 97%. A small number of the sensitivity errors were attributable to errors in chromatographic confirmation techniques.     

Garcia and the Political Safeguards of Federalism: Is There a Better Solution to the Conundrum of the Tenth Amendment?

In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985),Justice Harry Blackmun held that the Tenth Amendment does notprevent the Congress from subjecting state and local governmentsto the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, concludingthat the "political safeguards offederalism" are generally adequateto protect state interests on the national scene. This articleexamines the intellectual foundations of the "political safeguardsof federalism" and finds them inadequate. It then surveys thepost-Garcia scholarship to ascertain whether an alternativetheory of the Tenth Amendment has emerged. Concluding that ithas not, the author suggests the need for afresh approach inview of the hints contained in Justice Sandra Day O'Connor'sopinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) that five justices maybe ready to reexamine the central thesis of Garcia.