Repeated arson: data from criminal records.

The criminal careers of all arsonists convicted in former West-Germany between 1983 and 1985 who were found not to be responsible due to diminished responsibility for psychiatric reasons and a random sample (every third) of all criminally liable arsonists during the same period of time were followed up until 1994 by means of their trial records. Reappearance before the court for arson did not differ between the groups. When subjects are grouped by the additional occurrence of crimes other than arson, however, arsonists with diminished responsibility are the most problematic group: In comparison with all other subgroups, the arsonists who were partly responsible who did not commit any crimes other than arson showed the highest number of fire-setting incidents. Among the arsonists who committed other crimes as well, arsonists with diminished responsibility had the highest number of additional offences.     

The Issue of Ethics and Authority for Licensed Mental Health Professionals Involved in Parenting Coordination

We examine the ethics of licensed mental health professionals accepting the authority inherent in binding arbitration when acting as parenting coordinators (PCs). PCs execute their duties under the umbrella of their professional identity and standards of practice. Fundamental differences exist in how the law and the behavioral sciences conceive human behavior and authority, in particular, authority by role and authority by status. Ethical concerns arise when licensed mental health professionals accept the authority to render binding judgments and ask clients to surrender their autonomy through informed consent. We offer recommendations for PCs to avoid these ethical complications.     

Single primer extension (SPEX) amplification to accurately genotype highly damaged DNA templates

High levels of non-authentic sequence data can be generated by traditional PCR-based methodologies when DNA is damaged, template numbers are small and/or the target amplification size too large. We therefore present an alternate methodology based on single primer extension (SPEX) amplification; that places no pre-defined size constraints on amplification and interacts with only one of the DNA strands at the target locus.     

The determination of psilocin and psilocybin in hallucinogenic mushrooms by HPLC utilizing a dual reagent acidic potassium permanganate and tris(2,2'-bipyridyl)ruthenium(II) chemiluminescence detection system

This paper describes a procedure for the determination of psilocin and psilocybin in mushroom extracts using high-performance liquid chromatography with postcolumn chemiluminescence detection. A number of extraction methods for psilocin and psilocybin in hallucinogenic mushrooms were investigated, with a simple methanolic extraction being found to be most effective. Psilocin and psilocybin were extracted from a variety of hallucinogenic mushrooms using methanol. The analytes were separated on a C12 column using a (95:5% v/v) methanol:10 mM ammonium formate, pH 3.5 mobile phase with a run time of 5 min. Detection was realized through a dual reagent chemiluminescence detection system of acidic potassium permanganate and tris(2,2'-bipyridyl)ruthenium(II). The chemiluminescence detection system gave improved detectability when compared with UV absorption at 269 nm, with detection limits of 1.2 x 10(-8) and 3.5 x 10(-9) mol/L being obtained for psilocin and psilocybin, respectively. The procedure was applied to the determination of psilocin and psilocybin in three Australian species of hallucinogenic mushroom.     

Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and the Marrakesh Accords

This article reviews basic insights about compliance and "hard" enforcement that can be derived from various non-cooperative equilibrium concepts, and evaluates the Marrakesh Accords in light of these insights. Five different notions of equilibrium are considered – the Nash equilibrium, the subgame perfect equilibrium, the renegotiation proof equilibrium, the coalition proof equilibrium, and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. These various types of equilibrium have a number of implications for effective enforcement: (1) Consequences of non-compliance should be more than proportionate. (2) Punishment needs to take place on the Pareto frontier, rather than by reversion to some suboptimal state. (3) An effective enforcement system must be able to curb collective as well as individual incentives to cheat. (4) A fully transparent enforcement regime is not unconditionally a good thing. It is concluded that constructing an effective system for "hard" enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol is a formidable task that has only partially been accomplished by the Marrakesh Accords. In practice, however, the design of the compliance system for the climate regime had to balance a desire to minimize non-compliance against other important goals, including the need for due process.