The Indigenous Land Corporation: An Analysis of Its Performance Five Years On

The Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC) is a relatively new Commonwealth statutory authority which commenced its operations on 5 June 1995. It is new not only in the sense of its short existence, but also in the unique framework enshrined in its enabling legislation that aims to provide improved outcomes in Indigenous land acquisition and land management. This article explores this unique policy and operational framework, contrasts it with past Commonwealth policies and practices for Indigenous land acquisition and management, and assesses the ILC's performance in its initial five years. The article argues that notwithstanding this new framework, the potential for future success will lie in the ability of the ILC to substantially address long-standing issues in the management of the Indigenous estate which now comprises in excess of 15 percent of Australia.     

'Small Steps' or 'Great Leaps': How the Swedish Greens Are Learning the Lessons of Government Participation

As Green parties have solidified their positions within the Western European party systems, they have increasingly faced opportunities and pressures to participate in government at varying levels. This has raised significant questions regarding both how the Greens should progress strategically in relation to other longstanding political parties and also whether participation in government represents a process of 'institutionalisation' and a loss of the Greens'new politics' credentials. This paper examines the strategic changes and developments within the Swedish Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna) as it has come to terms with opportunities to participate in government. It argues that the decisions within the party have reflected not only internal ideological debates, but also external pressures and opportunities. It also demonstrates that the experiences of the party at local and municipal levels have played a major role in encouraging the national party to consider negotiating with other parties. The paper attempts to draw lessons from the experiences of the Swedish Greens which may prove useful in trying to comprehend the future challenges and pressures facing the continued development of Europe's Green parties.     

Public versus Private Managers: How Public and Private Managers Differ in Leadership Behavior

This article aims to find out whether there are behavioral differences between public and private sector managers. Two groups of public managers (managers of social insurance agencies and public school principals) and a group of private managers (two samples) are investigated. Behavioral dimensions are investigated including leadership style (task, relationship, and change orientation), decision‐making style (the functions of sensing, intuition, thinking, and feeling), and motivation profile (achievement, affiliation, and power motivation). An analysis of data from 459 managers in four organizations in Sweden reveal significant differences in behavior between public and private managers. However, no significant differences in leadership behavior are discovered among public managers. Possible explanations for such differences and similarities are explored.     

Does the flypaper model stick? A test of the relative performance of the flypaper and conventional models of local government budgetary behaviour

Two of the most widely referred to models of local (or state) budgetary behaviour are developed and tested. The models considered are a variant of the flypaper model (see, for example, Courant et al., 1979 and Oates, 1979) and a conventional model which builds on the seminal work of Wilde (1969, 1971). The models are developed in a manner which allows them to be tested empirically using data for English local governments. Two types of test are employed: the ability of the two models to explain the variations in expenditure levels across local governments within any given fiscal year; the ability of the models to predict future levels of expenditure given changes to local government budget constraints (as brought about, for example, by changs in grants-in-aid from central government).     

Managing North Sea Pollution Effectively:Linking International and Domestic Institutions

Most pollution problems arise as by-products of domestic activity. The effectiveness of international environmental regimes thus depends on the operations of domestic political and administrative institutions. However, the study of regime effectiveness tends to overlook the operation of domestic institutions as well as the interests and preferences of sub-national non-state actors. In this article, a framework for combining the study of regime effectiveness with domestic institutions and actors is initially presented. The merits of this framework within the context of the North Sea regime is then explored. The article concludes that the effectiveness of this regime depends on the operation of both international and domestic institutions. Of particular importance are those sub-national actors actually causing the problem in the first place as well as domestic institutions influencing the behaviour of target groups.     

Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance

One of the proposed alternatives to Kyoto’s cap-and-trade approach is a regime based on an internationally harmonized carbon tax. In this paper, we consider and compare the enforcement problems associated with a tax regime and a cap-and-trade regime, respectively. The paper tries to convey two main points. First, both types of regime require an_. effective enforcement mechanism. However, such a mechanism is unlikely to be adopted as part of a regime with full participation, because the political process leading up to its adoption tends to water down the enforcement mechanism to a point where it no longer has much bite. And even if this is somehow avoided, countries expecting compliance to be difficult or costly will almost certainly decline to sign—not to mention ratify—the resulting agreement. Second, the implications of non-compliance in a tax regime differ in important ways from the corresponding implications in a cap-and-trade regime. In a cap-and-trade regime emissions trading can make inaction legitimate for buyers of emission permits. In particular, overselling of permits by one (or a few) permit exporting countries might completely undermine the regime’s environmental effect. In a tax regime, by contrast, one country’s non-compliance can not make inaction by other countries legitimate. It follows that an agreement based on a harmonized carbon tax will always have some effect, provided that at least one country complies.