TAIWAN AND HONG KONG: CHINA'S POLICIES AND PROSPECTS (Review Article)

The author defines state-building as a process of increasing the capabilities within a society for the benefit of its population, noting that, traditionally, in Afghanistan villages were run through consent, though the state has usually preferred force. He then examines the various factors said to inhibit state-building – geography, class, the warlords, ethnicity and political Islam – drawing relevant comparisons with other South Asian states. His conclusion is that it has indeed been most difficult to try to build a functioning state in Afghanistan, partly because of the war, but partly because force is no substitute for consent.     

The heart of Asia and the roof of the world

This article concentrates almost entirely on the events of 1971 and the author's involvement in the “sometimes complicated and frustrating negotiations and consultations” which led up to the signing at the end of 1971 of the various Treaties of Friendship as Britain withdrew from the Gulf, leaving behind a number of independent states, including the United Arab Emirates.     

The Effects of German Unification on the Federal Chancellor's Decision-Making

The purchase of Germany's Mannesmann AG by Britain's telecommunications holding company Vodafone in spring 2000 represented the first major cross-border hostile takeover in German corporate history. As spectacle, the story surrounding the fall of one of Germany's grandest industrial giants lays bare the underlying themes shaping the country's national discourse over how to build a new national consensus on the function of economic activity for the state, for society, and for the German citizen. As such, the Mannesmann-Vodafone saga contains a clear caesura between the Old and the New Economy in Germany. Of course the question remains which values and institutions do the Germans want to carry over from the old world into the new. And there the line between past and present becomes distinctly less discernible.     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.