Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective

Throughout the advanced countries of the world self-regulatory regimes are being introduced. This article suggests that, at least in some contexts, industry self-regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior) and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory. The article examines the strengths and to a lesser extent the weaknesses of industry self-regulation from five closely related yet distinct vantage points: mediating institutions; industrial morality; institutionalizing responsibility; institutions responding to external pressure; and the roles of the state and third parties.     

Shooting yourself in the foot

He has taught there since 1967 and is the author of five books, including several on international food issues, and over forty articles. He has been a Guggenheim Fellow, a Rockefeller Fellow, and a fellow of the German Marshall Fund; and consultant to the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Food Program, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. His current research is on food aid to Africa.     

Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era

In part A. The patronage era we explain of the changing organization of public employees from patrons to spoilsmen. (Part B. Civil service and militancy, explains the evolution from spoilsmen to civil servants to militant unionists). Commonly, each transformation has been related only to some failing of its preceding form: patronage ended because of its corruption, civil service began because of its promise to stop corruption, and militancy spread because of the inadequacies of civil service. In contrast to these different explanations of each transformation of government employment, we offer the same explanation for each change: a public choice theory assumption that the new organizational form more efficiently maximized the mixture of votes, power, and income that politicians seek. Thus, when poor immigrants promised votes for insurance from urban hazards and businessmen promised graft in return for accommodations, spoilsmen effected the exchanges.