Potato‐led growth: The macroeconomic effects of technological innovations in Bolivian agriculture

Through the use of a Computable General Equilibrium model we measure the economy‐wide effects of improving the production technology of relatively non‐traded staples (potatoes, maize), import crops (wheat), and export crops (soybeans) in Bolivia. The results of the analysis suggest that technological innovations in the production technology of potatoes would benefit the Bolivian economy most. We discuss the reasons for the limited effects of technological innovations in tradeable crops.     

The Consequences of Culture: Legal History,Labor Law,and the Contributions of Christopher Tomlins

This article reviews three books on labor law written by Christopher Tomlins. They are, in order of publication, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880–1960 (1985); Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic (1993); and Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580–1865 (2010). Tomlins has been an influential figure in the movement known as “critical legal studies” and has helped shape a new approach to the field of labor history, labor law, and the study of US workers. Over the span of twenty‐five years, Tomlins's research has been central to evolving theories of law and social interaction and has continuing relevance to more recent scholarly developments such as the field of “cultural cognition” studies.     

Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers

We argue that individuals use responsibility attribution heuristics that apply to collective decisions made, for example, by families, teams within firms, boards in international organizations, or coalition governments. We conduct laboratory and online experiments to tease out the heuristics subjects use in their responsibility attribution for collective decision makers. The lab experiments comprise a collective dictator game in which decision makers have weighted votes and recipients can punish individual decision makers. Our results show that recipients punish unfair allocations and mainly target the decision maker with proposal power and with the largest vote share. We find weak evidence that decision makers with veto power are targeted or that recipients punish proportional to vote share. The online experiment demonstrates that subjects indeed believe that the decision maker with proposal power has the most influence on the collective decision outcome. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of vote choice.