THE POWERS OF XI JINPING

Since becoming head of the Communist Party in China in late 2012, Xi Jinping has accrued an impressive raft of titles. He has been compared to the founder of the regime, Mao Zedong, and is seen by some as sitting at the centre of a network of different power sources. But is power as personalised as this model makes out in contemporary China, with all its complexity and diversity? And can one person really rule the continental sized country in this paternalistic way? This article argues that Xi's powers are intrinsically linked with the organisation that he leads and which his power is sourced in – the Party itself. Far from him being the emperor of modern China, it is the Communist Party which acts as the all-seeing, all-powerful ruler. In this model, Xi is its servant, not its master.     

NEW CHALLENGES

<正>A diverse range of global issues puts Chinese diplomacy to the testThe National People’s Congress,China’s top legislature,opened its annual full session on March 5.Both the Report on the Government Work delivered by Premier Li Keqiang at its opening and the press conference held on March 8 by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on its sidelines made one thing abundantly clear:What happens inside China is linked to and profoundly affects the outside world.Likewise,     

The Middle-Income Kingdom

正The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) opened in Beijing on November 8. The first day consisted of the report made by Hu Jintao, General Secretary     

Pathways to aggression and violence among African American adolescent males: the influence of normative beliefs, neighborhood, and depressive symptomatology

Youth violence continues to present a serious public health challenge in the United States, particularly so for African American adolescent males. The present study utilized a multilevel approach to predict aggression within a community sample of low-income, urban African American adolescent males (n?=?80). Participants' self-report data on normative beliefs about aggression, exposure to community violence, and depressive symptoms were used in multiple regression equations to predict (a) self-reported interpersonal aggression and (b) self-reported aggressive response style when angered. Results of this study indicate that all three of the independent variables contributed significantly to the prediction of interpersonal aggression and aggressive response style when angered. The findings are important for increasing our understanding of pathways to various types of youth aggression and guiding the development of evidence-based approaches to violence prevention among African American adolescent males.     

The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party

We analyze the first large‐scale, randomized experiment to measure presidential approval levels at all outcomes of a canonical international crisis‐bargaining model, thereby avoiding problems of strategic selection in evaluating presidential incentives. We find support for several assumptions made in the crisis‐bargaining literature, including that a concession from a foreign state leads to higher approval levels than other outcomes, that the magnitudes of audience costs are under presidential control prior to the initiation of hostilities, and that these costs can be made so large that presidents have incentive to fight wars they will not win. Thus, the credibility of democratic threats can be made extremely high. We also find, however, that partisan cues strongly condition presidential incentives. Party elites have incentives to behave according to type in Congress and contrary to type in the Oval Office, and Democratic presidents sometimes have incentives to fight wars they will not win.