Interrogative suggestibility,self‐esteem,and the influence of negative life‐events

Purpose. Past research has frequently demonstrated the impact of life adversity on the behaviour and mindset of individuals. In terms of the formal police interview, the experience of negative life‐events may have an effect upon interviewee performance. This study, therefore, aims to investigate how negative life‐events may influence interviewee performance on the Gudjonsson suggestibility scale (GSS). Moreover, self‐esteem will also be investigated in relation to both the experience of negative life‐events and interrogative suggestibility. Method. Sixty participants were administered the GSS1. In between the immediate and delayed recall phases, interviewees were asked to complete the culture‐free self‐esteem inventory, the life‐events questionnaire and the Eysenck personality questionnaire. Results. Negative life‐events (NLEs) were significantly correlated with all of the GSS suggestibility scores (yield 1, yield 2, shift and total Suggestibility). Contrary to past research, however, self‐esteem scores were not significantly related to any of the GSS components or to NLE scores. Conclusion. This paper is the first to show a link between the experience of NLEs and GSS scores. The findings suggest that interviewees reporting a high number of NLEs are significantly more susceptible to the leading questions, as well as to negative feedback, administered during the GSS interview. Erroneous reports and false confessions may thus be more likely with such interviewees, potentially classifying them as vulnerable witnesses.     

Be Careful What You Wish For: Security Challenges Facing the Korean Peninsula During a Potential Unification Process

There is a lacuna in the literature analyzing the mid-term (6-24 months) period after a DPRK contingency that results in the Pyongyang regime’s relatively sudden and unmanaged fall. This article helps fill that gap, particularly with respect to security issues that would challenge Korean unification efforts during such a period. Following an Introduction, Section I first makes the case for a DPRK contingency being the most plausible end to the Pyongyang regime. Assuming the scenarios from Section I, Section II addresses the question of what critical issues a unifying Korea will face over the mid-term, and how dealing with these challenges will condition the type of end-state that a unified Korea will embody. In particular we examine three challenges: (a) mid-term security provision related to potential weapons proliferation, cyber-security, organized criminality, and human security; (b) the foundations of institution-building through measures dealing with issues of transitional justice, disputed land title claims, and generating broad domestic stakeholder buy-in in a unifying Korea; (c) the disposition of Korea’s strategic alignment in a Northeast Asia that will have undergone a major alteration of the regional system. Section III concludes with policy recommendations concerning what efforts should be made now to prepare for the situations described in Sections I and II.     

President Roh Moo-Hyun’s Last Interview and the Roh Moo-Hyun Phenomenon in South Korea

This commentary discusses what is popularly regarded as the “Roh Moo-hyun Phenomenon” in today’s South Korean society, as an attempt to shed some light on an interview which the late President Roh Moo-hyun had with the author in December 2008. This interview is unique not only because it became Roh’s last interview conducted before his suicide on May 23, 2009, but also because it provides Roh’s candid critical self-assessment on his own presidency, especially regarding his role in both domestic politics and the inter-Korean relationship, and the Korea-US relationship during his term in office, as well as commenting on Japan’s approach to Northeast Asian regional politics. Reflecting on Roh’s star-like rise to the presidency and fall from grace, this commentary alerts readers that Roh’s last interview needs to be considered within the context of the Roh Moo-Hyun Phenomenon, especially in regard to the 2017 presidential election, because it will directly affect the fate of not just the “pro-Roh group,” with the largest share of the opposition in today’s Korean society, but the Korean people as a whole at a time when the country’s many leading civic groups are desperately seeking a “Great Transformation.”     

Pseudo Change: China’s Strategic Calculations and Policy Toward North Korea after Pyongyang’s 4th Nuclear Test

After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem.     

The Impact of Management Capacity on Government Innovation in Korea: An Empirical Study

ABSTRACT

A common assertion within public management is that management capacity drives policy outcomes. This study tests that argument, focusing on an important policy outcome—innovation. Data were drawn from the Korean government to examine the impact of government's management capacity for the adoption and implementation of innovation. The results confirm that both managerial behaviors and structures are drivers of government innovation. The adoption and implementation of innovative projects require full-scale management capacity, encompassing innovative leadership, a quality workforce, appropriate structures/systems, and the ability to manage external influences. These results suggest that public management capacity drives innovation in government by changing managerial behaviors and structures. Implications of these results for managing government innovation are discussed.     

A Computational Model of the Citizen as Motivated Reasoner: Modeling the Dynamics of the 2000 Presidential Election

A computational model of political attitudes and beliefs is developed that incorporates contemporary psychological theory with well-documented findings from electoral behavior. We compare this model, John Q. Public (JQP), to a Bayesian learning model via computer simulations of observed changes in candidate evaluations over the 2000 presidential campaign. In these simulations, JQP reproduces responsiveness, persistence, and polarization of political attitudes, while the Bayesian learning model has difficulty accounting for persistence and polarization. We conclude that “motivated reasoning”—the discounting of information that challenges priors along with the uncritical acceptance of attitude-consistent information—is the reason our model can better account for persistence and polarization in candidate evaluations.