Military Entrepreneurs: Patterns in Latin America

Despite the recent shift to democratic regimes and market‐based economies, in many Latin American countries the military retains important economic roles as owner, manager, and stakeholder in economic enterprises. Such military entrepreneurship poses a challenge to the development of democratic civil‐military relations and, by extension, to the development of liberal democracy in the region. While scholars have noted this situation with concern, they have given little attention to distinguishing the different types of military entrepreneurship, which reflect distinct historical patterns and implications. This article identifies two major types of military entrepreneurs in Latin America: industrializers, determined to build national defense capabilities and compete for international prestige; and nation builders, seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion. Case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Ecuador demonstrate important differences between these two types in their origins, paths, and political consequences.     

More Inequality,More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

The hypothesis of inequality as the source of violent conflict is investigated empirically in the context of killings by Nepalese Maoists in their People's War against their government during 1996–2003. The dependent variable is the total number of people killed during that period by Maoist rebels in each of 3,857 villages. Inequality is measured by the Gini, the Esteban‐Ray polarization index, and four other between‐groups indexes. Using models with district fixed effects, and instrumenting for endogeneity of the inequality measures, we find strong evidence that greater inequality escalated killings by Maoists. Poverty did not necessarily increase violence. Education moderated the effect of inequality on killing, while predominance of farmers and of Nepali speakers exacerbated it. We find evidence that more killings occurred in populous villages, lending support to the idea that violence was directed at expanding the Maoist franchise by demonstrating that opposition to the monarchy and elites in power was possible to achieve.     

Models for commercialization of technology from universities and research laboratories

One of the most admired aspects of U.S. technology has been the ability to assimilate and commercialize new science and technology. In light of the rising international competition, there has been new emphasis placed on the commercialization of U.S. science and technology developed in the federal laboratories. While research and development remains the focus of these laboratories, passage of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Act of 1980 and the Technology Transfer Act of 1986 has resulted in a means to further the exploitation of discoveries, patents, and copyrights developed within the laboratories. The transfer of technology to industrial partners and users is a complex task for a federal laboratory. Since the interaction with industry, as well as market knowledge and assessment of the needs of business users are beyond the charter of a federal laboratory, new organizational mechanisms are required in order to obtain full commercial value from the laboratories' efforts. A study was instituted to examine selected organizational and policy arrangements for achieving the optimum commercial value from the science and technology research at the research and development laboratories sponsored and funded by the U.S. government.     

The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence

This paper examines the reasons whycorruption and policy distortions tend toexhibit a high degree of persistence incertain regimes. We identify circumstancesunder which a firm seeks to evaderegulations through (i) bribery of localinspectors, and (ii) by lobbying high-levelgovernment politicians to resist legalreforms designed to improve judicialefficiency (rule of law) and eliminatecorruption. We show that in some casespolitical instability reinforces thesetendencies. The analysis predicts that inpolitically unstable regimes, theinstitutions necessary to monitor andenforce compliance are weak. In suchcountries, corruption therefore is morepervasive, and the compliance withregulations is low. We test thesepredictions using cross-country data. Theempirical results support the predictionsof the model. Political instability reducesjudicial efficiency, which in turnstimulates corruption. Thus, the effect ofpolitical instability on corruption is notdirect, but occurs indirectly via itseffect on the degree of judicialefficiency. Finally, corruption lowers thelevel of regulatory compliance. Thus,political instability indirectly affects compliance, via judicial efficiency andcorruption.