Income Inequality and Redistributive Spending: Evidence from Panel Data of Texas Counties

Abstract

The relationship between redistributive spending and income inequality has been of interest to researchers for several decades. Existing literature has largely focused on country-level studies and may be broadly divided into two groups: studies that find a positive relationship between the two and studies that find a negative relationship. The positive association is usually explained through the median voter theory and the negative association through the social insurance theory.

This study offers a test of the median voter and social insurance hypotheses by examining the relationship between economic inequality, voter turnout and redistributive spending at the sub-national level among the 50 largest counties in Texas over years 2006 to 2012. One of the advantages of using a regional sample is that counties are relatively more homogeneous and allow for the collection of better records across time. Random effects models suggest that income inequality is positively associated with redistributive spending. The study improves our understanding of the patterns of redistribution at the sub-national level and highlights the importance of careful inter-temporal modelling of relationships between redistributive spending and inequality.     

The threat of polluted air and the policies to control the problem in the Seoul metropolitan area

Air pollution is a serious problem in the Seoul Metropolitan area and other major urban centers in Korea. Heavy concentration of industries, a large population in excess of 11 million in high density, and an explosive growth of automobiles have contributed to air pollution in Seoul along with the neglect of environmental issues in the process of industrial and social changes. Although the official statistical data do not show that air pollution has reached a critical level, a survey data of public opinion indicates that a concern for environmental pollution is serious.

The central government of Korea has taken some major policy measures to address the environmental pollution problem. The government expenditures for environmental programs have significantly increased throughout the 1980's. The government has adopted policies to switch fuels for industrial, commercial, and domestic use from high pollution coals and heavy oil to nonpolluting natural gas. The government has adopted incentive programs to offer economic benefits to those buying electric cars and cars running on compressed natural gas or alcohol.

It is not clear how effective these policy measures will be in curbing environmental pollution. But it is clear that the choice of the citizens for a new life style which is environmentally clean is a new imperative for survival in the same way as economic development at any cost was the imperative for economic survival in the 1960's and the 1970's.     

Reforming government with information technology in South Korea

The South Korean government recently launched 11 major e‐government services after a long period of inter‐ and intra‐ministry politics concerning the allocation of jurisdiction over various e‐government services. This article analyses the politics of e‐government efforts in South Korea. It begins by describing the development of e‐government policy in South Korea for the past two decades, and identifies its four major features as comprehensiveness, fragmentation, the orientation toward operational efficiency and citizen services, and the inclination toward new technological solutions. The article concludes that these features can be attributed to the heavy involvement of the macro political system, its high susceptibility to inputs from experts, and the institutional design of the informatisation subsystem.     

Do National Economic and Political Conditions Affect Ideological Media Slant?

Political scientists are interested in the influence of the news media on politics. However, relatively few studies investigate whether or not ideological slant in news coverage changes systematically over time. If it changes systematically, what factors explain the changes? This study argues that external conditions, such as national political and economic situations, influence ideological media slant at the aggregate level. To examine this argument, “macro media bias” is measured quarterly by gauging the relative size of liberal and conservative news stories regarding domestic issues from 1958 through 2004. Utilizing ARIMA models, this study reveals that the news media tend to negatively react to government spending. Also, economic conditions, such as unemployment and inflation, significantly explain changes in the relative number of liberal and conservative news stories.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Political Communication for the following free supplemental resource(s): the coding keywords, detailed coding rules, and alternative regression results.]     

Democratic Synergy and Victory in War, 1816–1992

This study investigates the question of why democracies are more likely to win wars than non-democracies. I argue that due to the transparency of the polities, and the stability of their preferences, once determined, democracies are better able to cooperate with their partners in the conduct of wars, and thereby are more likely to win wars. In support of my argument, the main findings in this study show that, other things being equal, the larger the number of democratic partners a state has, the more likely it is to win; moreover, democratic states are more likely to have democratic partners during wars. These results are in contrast with those in current literature about the high likelihood of prevailing by democracies in wars, which emphasize, on the one hand, the superior capacity of democratic states to strengthen military capabilities and, on the other hand, to select wars in which they have a high chance of winning.     

政府规制与腐败

文章从经济性规制和社会性规制的角度对政府规制与腐败的因果关系进行了深入的分析 ,指出经济性规制具有限制市场竞争的特点 ,而市场竞争被抑制的领域必然会产生经济租 ,并导致公务员和政治家的腐败。而在社会性规制领域 ,规制手段的不合理性和规制执行的任意性成为腐败产生的温床和土壤。在此基础上 ,文章提出了有效减少腐败的规制改革方案。     

Political corruption,economic performance,and electoral outcomes: a cross-national analysis

The current study examines how the incumbent government's economic performance plays a role in mediating the impact of political corruption on electoral outcomes in 115 developing countries with relatively higher levels of corruption than Western consolidated democracies. Borrowing theoretical insights from the information-processing theory of voting, this study finds that political corruption becomes a formative electoral factor when the regime fails to sustain a sufficient level of economic growth. Otherwise, political corruption is not a significant factor that shapes electoral outcomes, irrespective of the level of perceived corruption, because the economy occupies voters' minds as the most important issue, making it a more accessible issue than political corruption.     

Statism and asian political economy: Is there a new paradigm?

Abstract

Given that statism has been so intensively reviewed recently, it is reasonable to ask why there is a need to produce another review. The key lies in the nature, not the quantity, of the previously published reviews. A survey of the existing literature shows that most of the reviewers are loyalist critics whose goal is to build statism as a new paradigm of Asian political economy. Emphasizing statism's contribution in expanding the debate on Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) beyond the market-centric analysis, they offer opinions on this theory that are positive—not surprisingly—and on the whole even generous. Misled by statism's anti-market rhetoric, some writers from a more critical tradition have also embraced statism as a new departure for studies of Asian capitalist development. Consequently, statism has escaped a rigorous scrutiny, which is long overdue.     

Optimal agency contracts: The effect of vicarious liability and judicial error

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a deep-pocket principal is often held responsible for a third-party harm caused by a judgment-proof agent’s negligence. We analyze the incentive contract used by the principal to control the agent’s behavior when a court can make an error in determining the agent’s negligence. We show that (1) reducing the error of declaring the agent not negligent even when he was (pro-defendant or type II error) is better than reducing the error of declaring the agent negligent even when he was not (pro-plaintiff or type I error) and (2) allowing the principal to penalize the agent even when the court declares the agent not negligent improves welfare. The latter supports the argument that causing an accident (or a reliable allegation of misconduct) should be sufficient to justify a “just cause” termination of an employee.