The Constitution and Accountability for Public Functions

In review of judicial interpretation of the United States Constitution set against the current reality of American governance, the authors conclude that traditional separation of powers doctrines hold few constraints for delegation of "public functions" beyond the boundaries of the three branches. As the result of constitutional permissiveness, the legislative and executive departments have increasingly lost out (or abdicated) to private and quasi-governmental institutions to conduct core government functions. Public accountability has been lost in this exchange. At a time of revolutionary change across Eastern Europe and elsewhere, when newly forming governments look to the United States for structural models, they are unlikely to be informed about the functional reality of American governance by either the written constitution or doctrines articulating the constitution.     

The Concept of Subsidiarity and the Debate on European Cooperation: Pitfalls and Possibilities1

This article explores whether and how subsidiarity can serve as an instructive aid to discussion and clarification of the current and future structure and functioning of the European Community. W e argue that the debate over the principle of subsidiarity may be undermined or cut off prematurely in at least three ways. First, if the debate is conducted with a view to arriving at a fairly fixed, detailed and instrumental understanding of the allocation of responsibilities and tasks between different levels of government. Second, if the principle of subsidiarity is mainly used as an instrument of political expediency and opportunism to further organizational or self interests. Third, if the principle is linked to and interpreted as an endorsement and justification of existing (entrenched) political and social doctrines. In a concluding last section we consider how the principle of subsidiarity may contribute to constructive discussion.     

Voter Responses to Referenda Seeking to Exceed Revenue Limits

Following voter approval of California's Proposition 13, a body of research has attempted to explain referenda outcomes aimed at restricting public sector tax and spending authority. Evaluating the determinants of voter attitudes toward referenda to exceed spending/revenue limits, however, has received little attention. Using data for all Wisconsin school districts, we examine the outcomes of referenda to exceed revenue caps. A key finding of our research is that when voters support bonding for capital expenditures, they tend also to approve referenda to override revenue limits. This enables school districts to cover new operating costs often associated with new capital projects.     

The Social Psychology of Making and Responding to Hospital Complaints: An Account Model of Complaint Processes*

Drawing on a study of 399 hospital complaints entering the National Health Service formal complaints procedure, this paper analyzes the interaction between complainant and hospital as a social episode in which the hospital is called to account for violation of the complainant's normative expectations and makes its response. The non-instrumental and uncrystallized character of many complaints is emphasized. Letters of complaint and replies from the hospital were readily analyzed in terms of the proposed model, providing insights into the social psychology of complaining, the goals of complainants, and the elements of successful apologies. Factors correlating with complainants' satisfaction further support the model and confirm the importance of a socially appropriate response to complaints. The implications of the study are discussed both in relation to hospital complaints and in the context of the literature on disputing more broadly.