Economic Models in Politics: An Introduction

The constitutional future of the European Union (EU) has attracted many scholars in economics and political science to apply their knowledge on political institutions and propose concrete suggestions. We highlight that economists and political scientists proceed quite differently in this endeavour and suggest that, due to this, they also are exposed to different pitfalls. We illustrate this by critically assessing specific proposals made in the context of the proposed constitution for the EU.     

Diversifying Nature Protection: Evaluating the Changing Tools for Forest Protection in Canada and Norway

Governments increasingly struggle to protect representative nature types and ecological diversity within their territories only via the instrument of publicly designated protected areas. This article examines the rise of voluntary conservation and certification (i.e., private conservation) as tools for forest protection in Norway and Canada. We contrast the differing potential of these private conservation tools with protection through government legislation and regulation using four evaluative criteria: the representativeness of protected areas, the strength of protection, the longevity of protection, and the information generated through protection. We find that private conservation tools can match the strength of legal protection and help to dispel conflict, but that private tools create protection that is more likely to be reversed in the future. However, we also show that voluntary private conservation can become public protection, which highlights the importance of examining different paths toward secure and long‐lasting protection.     

Power Sharing: Institutions,Behavior, and Peace

Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power‐sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power‐sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power‐sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power‐sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power‐sharing behavior that these institutions induce.     

Das Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates und der Mythos einer 80-Prozent-Europäisierung in Deutschland

Governance beyond the nation state is intensively discussed with regard to the degree of Europeanization of the member states. For some scholars, the Europeanization degree of German legislation has already reached a share of 80 percent. This article applies a quantitative perspective and investigates, whether and to what extent German legislation has been stimulated by European impulses over the past 30 years. In contrast to previous studies, the analysis distinguishes between regular and important legislation and examines whether and to what extent European impulses are induced by EU legislation. The results reveal that previous estimates have dramatically overstated the influence of Europeanization on German legislation. According to our findings, a share of 80 percent has only once occurred in a single policy domain. Usually, this share is significantly lower, in particular for important legislation. Moreover, it is only possible to identify the reasons for half of the Europeanization impulses in the respective EU legislative database.     

An Algebraic Analysis of Normative Systems

In the present paper we study how subsystems of a normative system can be combined, and the role of such combinations for the understanding of hypothetical legal consequences. A combination of two subsystems is often accomplished by a normative correlation or an intermediate concept. To obtain a detailed analysis of such phenomena we use an algebraic framework. Normative systems are represented as algebraic structures over sets of conditions. This representation makes it possible to study normative systems using an extension of the theory of Boolean algebras, called the theory of Boolean quasi-orderings.     

The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.