Lay perspectives on legal conundrums

Criminal law remains divided on the question of whether objectivity or subjectivity should be its dominant basis. Does liability begin with an objective act or harm, or with, subjective intent? In the first experiment, dealing with the conundrum of impossible act cases, the question is, Will respondents convict on subjective grounds (where intent to murder is clear), even when amanifest criminal act andharmful consequences are absent? The results show that they do convict, though their subjective preference moderates and even reverses with certain types of mistakes, or when thepotential harm, though not the actual harm, is perceived as high. In the second experiment, dealing with mistaken act and self-defense cases, the question is, Will subjectivity be determinative, or will respondents weigh objectivity more as the mistake gets more unreasonable? The results show that objectivity is weighed heavily, as fears of a plunge into subjective waters prove groundless Without legal guidelines, respondents navigate these conundrums by shifting their objective vs. subjective balance point, guided by good common sense.     

Targeting Federal Assistance to Local Governments in Rural and Low-Income Areas, 1972-1983

Two questions have predominated policy discussions about theallocation of federal aid to rural local governments duringthe last two decades: whether rural areas were getting their"fair share" and whether the aid was appropriately targetedto deserving communities. An analysis of data for 1972–1983shows that although the position of rural governments apparentlyimproved during the 1970s, the gains were principally due tosharply increased loans to rural areas, while urban areas benefitedfrom increases in grants-in-aid. Conversely, the aid reductionsof the early 1980s, by cutting into loans, which are less valuablethan grants, appear to have hurt rural areas less than urbanareas. A modest amount of income-targeting in federal developmentfunds was evident in the early 1970s, but it deteriorated duringthe following decade. By 1983 counties with higher incomes andmore satisfactory levels of public services received higherlevels of aid than places that might have been considered moreneedy. While the reasons for the generally diminished targetingare not clear, several possibilities, including the increasingimportance of loans as a federal aid mechanism, are considered.     

Split-brain madness

With facts and metaphors regarding differential functioning of our two hemispheres proliferating faster than our understanding, the potential for a new insanity defense to emerge to fit certain Jekylland-Hyde-like defendants clearly exits. And with psychologists of varying stripes entering the courtroom with greater frequency and in newer capacities, the dangers of entanglement and error grow. This paper analyzes a split-brain insanity defense on the grounds of legal, logical, psychological, and current neuropsychological evidence. In addition, the likelihood, import, and place of this defense in the historical context of insanity defenses is examined. The concept of personal responsibility, which has been both asserted and denied by experts in split-brain or split-psyche cases, is tried; and a closing summary to the jury is offered.     

Sea Grant — The MIT Sea Grant Marine Industry collegium: A partnership of industry,government and academia

The Collegium has fostered interaction and technology transfer between MIT and the Marine Industry for five years, resulting in early utilization of the fruits of marine research at MIT and valuable guidance for MIT Sea Grant in addressing needs of industry. For maximum technology transfer to take place effectively in an academic/industry program, a number of conditions have to be met. This paper discusses three of the most important conditions. First, industry people must be aware of the interests and research capabilities of the faculty and of the resources available to the university. Second, successful technology transfer is a person to person interaction between people of common interest and roughly equivalent technical background. Third, and very important, technology transfer is communication from the recipient, or user, to the source of technology. Along with these three conditions is the need for early involvement of industry and government user in the research activity. The Collegium is a unique arrangement to accomplish these conditions. This paper describes the program at MIT.     

Insanity,justification, and culpability toward a unifying schema

Insanity has long been viewed as an excuse rather than a justification: Insane people are acquitted not because they did nothing wrong, but because they are considered morally blameless for their wrongful conduct. A new substantive test based on justificatory rather than exculpatory principles—a quasisubjective justification (QSJ) test—is compared to Finkel's relative culpability test, and to two excuse oriented tests, ALI and IDRA, across seven cases. QSJ and Finkel's test both produced significant verdict differences, whereas ALI and IDRA verdicts were not significantly different. The QSJ effect, however, was observed only in cases judged low in justification, and thus did not play a determinative role across cases; other variables, such as perceived severity of the disorder and culpability for bringing about the disorder, to which only Finkel's test was sensitive, seem to have more explanatory power.     

Barring ultimate issue testimony

This research focuses on one of the major changes wrought by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: the exclusion of expert mental health testimony on the “ultimate issue,” that is, testimony specifically addressing the expert's opinion that the defendant is sane or insane. Subjects in this research were presented with 1 of 10 variants of an insanity case in which experts testified for the defense, prosecution, both, or neither. The testimony was at one of three levels: diagnostic only, penultimate issue, or ultimate issue. Results showed that level of testimony had no effect on the verdict pattern. There was evidence to suggest that this effect may occur because jurors infer, and/or mistakenly recall, higher levels of expert testimony than was actually presented to them. In addition, general and specific constructs (Finkel & Handel, 1989) that predict verdict yieldedR ² values from .500 to .668 and were not significantly affected by the level of expert testimony. Implications of these findings are discussed.