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991.
Despite much training in public administration over the past 20 years there has been little improvement in public service management in the Third World. This was anticipated in Schaffer's critical notion of ‘trainingism’. This concept, when applied to Papua New Guinea, helps us to understand why training has been unable to produce dramatic changes in public service performance. Training has been used to perform latent functions and has not been evaluated. The situation is currently under review as new initiatives are taking place to improve training's contribution to public service efficiency and effectiveness.  相似文献   
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Economists have long believed that private provision of public goods will be inefficient, though recently some have argued that altruism may mitigate the inefficiencies. Without altruism, agents contribute to the point where marginal cost equals their private marginal benefits. With altruism, they contribute more and hence are closer to the point where marginal cost and total marginal benefits are equated. In an earlier paper (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989), we showed that private provision need not be inefficient. In a very natural model of private provision without altruism, we showed that the set of (undominated perfect) equilibrium outcomes is identical to the core. Here we consider the effect of altruism on private provision. Altruism essentially creates more public goods because the well-being of others becomes a public good. We show that our model of private provision still has efficient equilibria under a wide variety of circumstances. Interestingly, the equilibria may be inefficient when agents are concerned about the effect of private provision on the distribution of wealth. Intuitively, the game we consider is a very powerful instrument for efficient private provision, but must be supported by other instruments if the set of public goods is expanded too far.We wish to thank Jim Andreoni, Ted Bergstrom, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and to acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation through NSF Grant SES-8520296. Of course, any remaining errors are our responsibility.  相似文献   
999.
This article develops a case for taking a broad perspective on the benefits generated from government involvement in international services. In particular it shows how government scientists and other officers, through involvement in exporting government services, can gain and maintain important scientific knowledge, and access genetic material from overseas. These activities may be vital for the establishment of new industries, as well as maintaining production efficiency in the private sector.
The article further illustrates, through a case study, the unique role for government in assisting the private sector open up trade opportunities. In the case study example this was facilitated through sourcing overseas technology to treat mangos for fruit fly, and then after extensive testing and scientific work negotiating the removal of quarantine barriers to gain access to the lucrative Japanese market.  相似文献   
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