No Shrinking Violet

Second Hand Roses 'founder and front man Liang Long talks about Nirvana, Nietzche and why he started wearing drag on stage.     

Extending the economic theory of regulation to the form of policy

The mutually beneficial connection between industries and the governments that regulate them is the subject of a large literature led by Stigler (1971). What has not been studied is how firms choose their desired policies from the set including entry barriers, price floors, subsidies, and demand stimulation. We take as given that government and incumbents from the supply and demand for regulation and explore the choice of political product.     

Improving evaluation of anti-crime programs: Summary of a National Research Council report★

This article summarizes a report of the National Research Council: Improving Evaluation of Anti-crime Programs. It is based on a workshop, held in September 2003, in which participants presented and discussed examples of evaluation-related studies that represent the methods and challenges associated with research at three levels: interventions directed toward individuals; interventions in neighborhoods, schools, prisons, or communities; and interventions at a broad policy level. The article, and the report on which it is based, is organized around five questions that require thoughtful analysis in the development of any evaluation plan: What questions should the evaluation address? When is it appropriate to conduct an impact evaluation? How should an impact evaluation be designed? How should the evaluation be implemented? What organizational infrastructure and procedures support high quality evaluation? The authors highlight major considerations in developing and implementing evaluation plans for criminal justice programs and make recommendations for improvement of government funded evaluation studies.     

The regular article tracking developments at the national level in key European countries in the area of IT and communications – Co-ordinated by Herbert Smith LLP and contributed to by firms across Europe

This column provides a concise alerting service of important national developments in key European countries. Part of its purpose is to compliment the Journal's feature articles and Briefing Notes by keeping readers abreast of what is currently happening “on the ground” at a national level in implementing EU level legislation and international conventions and treaties. Where an item of European National News is of particular significance, CLSR may also cover it in more detail in the current or a subsequent edition.     

THE SUBURBAN MOVEMENT TO LIMIT GROWTH: REASONS FOR SUPPORT IN ORANGE COUNTY

Several studies have shown that suburban residents favor growth controls. It is usually argued that high-status residents and those living in growing comniunities want limited growth. This paper examines an alternative perspective; support for growth limits broadly found among individuals who perceive community problems. Specific reasons for wanting limited growth, however, vary in importance among different social group. These hypotheses are confirmed by 1,009 Orange County, California residents. Support for growth limits is strongest among those who perceive rapid growth, are dissatisfied with c i t y government, and perceive service problems. Environniental reasoris for wanting limited growth are mentioned most frequently. These concerns are especially noted by the high-status residents and nonfiscal conservatives. Economic reasons for limited growth are stated by a large minority, and are especially of interest to the lowstatus residents and fiscal conservatives. The results indicate public concerns vary among social groups comprising the citizen support for suburban growth limits. The implications for suburban policy formation and implementation are discussed.     

On the design of optimal mechanisms for the Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie economy

This essay presents necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for the general design of allocation mechanisms that decentralize Pareto optimal decisions in Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie (AHM) economies. An AHM economy is distinguished from the usual Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy since the consumption or production of any commodity may induce externalities, including initially endowed commodities. Because competitive markets will not generally internalize all externalities efficiently, the mechanism design must be generalized to include a rule that computes prices for commodities appearing as initial endowments so as to define consumers' individual budget sets. A natural design criterion for the generalized allocation mechanism is to have agents communicate both price and allocation messages to the center, enlarging the message space relative to that necessary for implementing mechanisms in Arrow-Debreu economies. The larger message spaces give agents increased flexibility, which has two significant consequences: (1) the dominant-strategy property of the Demand-Revealing Mechanism in economies with only public goods, a single pure private good, and quasilinear preferences, is lost unless the center adopts an enforcement structure that suitably restricts the allocation messages that agents may transmit; (2) if an endowed commodity is not a pure private good, then the Demand-Revealing Mechanism loses the dominant-strategy property, regardless of the enforcement structure adopted or of the nature of consumers' preferences, so that the problem is exacerbated in general AHM economies.     

Turf battles on medicine avenue

His interests include comparative health systems and Soviet socialized medicine.