“Boundary Delineation” in grenzüberschreitenden Policy‐Netzwerken: Primat der “Policies” oder der “Polity”? Das Fallbeispiel des Policy‐Netzwerks zur 28‐Tonnen‐Limite

Zur Analyse neuer Verhandlungssysteme der Politikformulierung hat sich seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre das Konzept der Policy‐Netzwerke herausge‐bildet. Verschiedentlich wurde diesen Netzwerkkonzepten in der Literatur vorgeworfen, dass bei dynamischen networking‐Prozessen nicht zwischen inhaltlichen und institutionell geprägten Aktivitäten unterschieden werden kann. Inwiefern sich diese These aufrecht erhalten lässt und welche Implikationen sie für die Ausdifferenzierung von grenzüberschreitenden Netzwerken birgt, ist Gegenstand des vorliegenden Beitrags. Die quantitative Netzwerkanalyse der schweizerischen Schwerverkehrspolitik im europäischen Umfeld über drei Phasen hinweg stützt die Institutionalismus‐These, wonach sich das grenzüberschreitende Netzwerk entlang der staatsrechtlich‐institutionellen Dimensionen Schweiz‐EU sowie staatlich‐parastaatlich/privat ausdifferenzierte. Die Sektorzugehörigkeit dagegen wirkte in dieser Konstellation erst innerhalb formal‐institutionell definierter Strukturen differenzierend.     

Flexible pensions for politicians

It may be difficult to motivate politicians in their last term. To solve this problem, we suggest a triple mechanism involving political information markets, flexible pensions, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the potential reelection chances of the politician. Pensions depend on the price in the information market and thereby motivate the politician to act in a socially optimal manner. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of flexible pensions.     

Decentralization and Fiscal Discipline in Sub-national Governments: Evidence from the Swiss Federal System

This article analyses the relationship between decentralizationand the extent of fiscal discipline in the Swiss cantons between1984 and 2000. From a theoretical point of view, decentralizationand federalism can be associated with both an expansive anda dampening effect on government debt. On the one hand, decentralizedstructures have been argued to lead to a reduction of debt dueto inherent competition between the member states and the multitudeof veto positions which restrict public intervention. On theother hand, decentralization has been claimed to contributeto an increase of public debt as it involves expensive functionaland organizational duplications as well as cost-intensive, oftendebt-financed, compromise solutions between a large number ofactors that operate in an uncoordinated and contradictory way.Our empirical results show that in periods of prosperous economicdevelopment, the architecture of state structure has no impacton debt. However, the degree of decentralization influencesdebt in economically poor times: In phases of economic recession,administratively decentralized cantons implement a more economicalbudgetary policy than centralized Swiss member states.     

Judicial Self-Governance Index: Towards better understanding of the role of judges in governing the judiciary

The aim of this article is to introduce a novel view on how to evaluate the share of power held by judges in judicial governance. Its contribution to court administration and the regulation of judges is three-fold. First, it provides a novel empirically tested conceptualization of judicial governance that includes 60 competences grouped into eight dimensions (ranging from selection and education of judges to case allocation and publication of judicial decisions). Second, it proposes a new Judicial Self-Governance (JSG) Index that measures how much power domestic judges hold in these eight dimensions of judicial governance. Third, by applying the JSG Index to the longitudinal data for Germany, Italy, Czechia, and Slovakia this article demonstrates that the Judicial Council model is not the only institutional model of judicial governance leading to the empowerment of judges. This means that judges can hold many powers without the existence of judicial councils and even in the Ministry of Justice model.     

Promotion of the Agricultural Sector and Political Power in Austria

In most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted. Two different viewsare presented to explain why: the Chicagoan view (“Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis”)and the Virginian view (inefficient outcome of political bargaining). A vertically structuredempirical model of the Austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses. Quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers/taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented.     

The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

Schweizer Welten des Sozialkapitals. Empirische Untersuchungen zum sozialen Leben in Regionen und Kantonen

To what extent do the Swiss Regions and Cantons differ with regard to their stock of social capital? Based on the data of the Swiss Household Panel this article presents the first empirical investigation of the accumulation of social capital in Swiss sub‐national units in a comparative perspective. Empirical evidence implies that the cantons of the German speaking region show more social capital than the French and Italian speaking parts of the country measured by the engagement in voluntary associations, or the interaction with colleagues and the neighbourhood. However, the Latin cantons show a greater stock of social interaction among family and close friends. Furthermore, our findings provide evidence for the existence of five Swiss worlds of social capital varying among the various types of social interaction.     

News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout

Despite dramatic increases in available political information through cable television and the Internet, political knowledge and turnout have not changed noticeably. To explain this seeming paradox, I argue that greater media choice makes it easier for people to find their preferred content. People who like news take advantage of abundant political information to become more knowledgeable and more likely to turn out. In contrast, people who prefer entertainment abandon the news and become less likely to learn about politics and go to the polls. To test this proposition, I develop a measure of people's media content preference and include it in a representative opinion survey of 2,358 U.S. residents. Results show that content preference indeed becomes a better predictor of political knowledge and turnout as media choice increases. Cable TV and the Internet increase gaps in knowledge and turnout between people who prefer news and people who prefer entertainment.