Grant Levels and Debt Issuance: Is There a Relationship? Is There Symmetry?

Although previous work on fiscal federalism and grants has focused on the effects of grants on expenditures, no published research examines the impact of decreasing grants on state financing. This research addresses how decreasing levels of federal grant money to states affect states' long-term debt issuance, and whether the relationship is symmetric for increasing and decreasing grants. The model is tested with time series, cross-sectional data from 1984 to 1999. The results show that grants affect debt issuance, the effect is asymmetric, and direction of the effect differs for different types of debt issuance.     

Peeling Away the Populist Rhetoric: Toward a Taxonomy of Anti-Tax Ballot Initiatives

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to both the fiscal and policy impact of tax and expenditure limitation ballot initiatives. This article instead examines how statewide anti-tax measures come to be placed before the general public for popular votes. It critically assesses six anti-tax measures on statewide ballots in 1996, questioning the wisdom that they were populist undertakings. While tax crusaders continue to draw on grassroots themes and use populist rhetoric, there are important differences across the groups sponsoring the six anti-tax measures, including their organizational history, professionalization, membership, and sources of financial support.     

Demokratie, Autokratie und die regulative Gestaltung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in Entwicklungsländern

This paper investigates into the political determinants of trade policy regulation in developing countries. When choosing between the trade policy instruments tariffs and quota governments consider the effects of these policies on their political support from interest groups and voters. It is argued that quantitative restrictions become increasingly less attractive as a country democratizes. Instead, motives of revenue generation gain importance. Therefore, the likelihood of democratic governments choosing quota is smaller than for their autocratic counterparts. Empirical tests based on a sample of 75 developing countries for the years 1979–1998 support the hypothesis.     

IPO effects: corporate restructuring when a firm goes public

The public affairs of a firm issuing an initial public offering (IPO) are a critical part of the corporate restructuring efforts which firms face during the process of going public. In this paper, Bowman and Singh's (1993) definition is used to illustrate how issuing an IPO is a significant form of corporate restructuring. Public affairs are critical during both the pre‐IPO phase and during the period leading up to the IPO, as the firm must negotiate a heavily institutionalised process to successfully complete the issue. Here, the six‐year life of ‘Deja News’ is used as a way to illustrate and explain the public affairs during the process of preparing for and issuing an IPO. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.