Who Preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law? Federalism and Political Accountability Under Global Trade Rules

With its "Burma law, " Massachusetts joined a procurement boycottof companies doing business in Burma. In Crosby v. NFTC, theU.S. Supreme Court held that Congress preempted the Massachusettslaw, even though Congress was silent on preemption. The Courtrelied on actions by executive-branch, foreign, and corporateactors to find that the state law was an obstacle to impliedobjectives of federal Burma sanctions. In doing so, the Courtdiffused congressional accountability for preemption and constrainedthe "constituent diplomacy" by which states and local governmentsuse their purchasing power to influence national policy andmultinational corporations. Crosby shifted the burden to Congressto express its intent not to preempt such measures. Congresshas several opportunities to meet this burden if it wants topreserve the diversity and balance that constituent diplomacybrings to the federal system.     

Politics and the New American Welfare States

Federal law allows states to create new welfare policies determining who can receive welfare, what types of clients are exempted from new welfare work requirements, and the value of cash benefits. This project tests nine different theoretical explanations of welfare policy to explain why states have reacted differently to this new authority. We test these explanations on Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) policies promulgated between 1997 and 2000. Our findings confirm the strong role of race in TANF politics that Soss et al. (2001) recently reported, but we also find that other constituent characteristics, and institutions, paternalistic goals, and state resources have a consistent influence on welfare policy. These results indicate that different approaches to welfare are attributable to the unique, and very potent, combination of political characteristics in each state.     

Contract–Management Capacity in Municipal and County Governments

Under pressure to do more with less, governments across the country have moved from direct service provision to providing services by contract. Proponents argue that contracting can reduce costs and improve flexibility and customer satisfaction. Critics point to a growing number of failed contracts, arguing there are numerous pitfalls associated with contracting. Missing from these debates is a discussion of how governments' managerial capacity can improve contract performance. In this article, we identify specific capacities that governments can use to harness the promise of contracting while avoiding its pitfalls. We present analyses of data on municipal and county government contracting activities that show how governments invest in contract– management capacity in response to several internal and external threats to effective contract performance. Because government investment in contract–management capacity is uneven—that is, some governments invest in less capacity even when circumstances would call for more—our analyses may help to explain why some contract arrangements are more successful than others.     

The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital

Democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy. We argue that there are significant indirect effects of democracy on growth through public health and education. Where economists use life expectancy and education as proxies for human capital, we expect democracy will be an important determinant of the level of public services manifested in these indicators. In addition to whatever direct effect democracy may have on growth, we predict an important indirect effect through public policies that condition the level of human capital in different societies. We conduct statistical investigations into the direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth using a data set consisting of a 30-year panel of 128 countries. We find that democracy has no statistically significant direct effect on growth. Rather, we discover that the effect of democracy is largely indirect through increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased secondary education in non poor countries.     

Prescriptions for punishment: Official ideologies and jall overcrowding

This study assesses key actors’ “worlds of fact” regarding jail overcrowding in California through an examination of their perceptions of causes and effects, support for different solutions, and adherence to major punishment ideologies. How policymakers define and structure a specific problem Gail overcrowding), can influence how policy options are differentially weighed as well as how existing policy processes can be improved. A mail survey was sent to two key decision making groups who largely regulate the intake and outflow of local jails: sheriffs and chief probation officers of the 58 California counties. Group differences in responses were predicted from the perspectives of blame avoidance, domain dissensus, and punishment theory. Relationships were examined among perceived causes, effects, solutions, and punishment ideologies. While both sheriffs and probation chiefs advocated highly similar “control-oriented” punishment ideologies, probation chiefs advocated more “progressive” solutions to jail overcrowding. Perceived causes and effects of jail overcrowding, along with support for deterrence ideology, were strongly related to elite support for three potential solutions: building more institutions, passing tougher laws to deter potential offenders, and using shorter sentences for low-risk offenders. Implications of these results for understanding jail overcrowding and policy processes are discussed.     

Quangos—What's in a Name? Defining Quangos from a Comparative Perspective

Without definitional clarity the "quango debate" is inherently flawed and meaningful progress undermined. A possible solution to this problem is proposed in this article by way of a subsectional map which aims to clarify the quango topography. This accepts the diversity inherent in the quango debate while allowing for increased clarity and focused research. This, the authors believe, is the only way forward for practitioners, academics and policymakers working within the sphere of quasi-government. There is a need to address precise forms or subsections of the quango continuum as studies or reforms which focus on one type of quango would not necessarily work if applied to all quangos, or quangos in other countries.     

Lesbian and gay theory,sexuality and citizenship

David Evans, Sexual Citizenship: The Material Construction of Sexualities, (Routledge, London 1993). 352pp. ISBN 0–4150–058007

Didi Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Equality, (University of Toronto Press, London 1994). ix+198pp. ISBN 0–8020–7231–3.

Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy, (Polity Press, Cambridge 1992). 212pp. ISBN 0–8047–2214–5.

Ken Plummer, Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds, (Routledge, London 1995). xii+244pp. ISBN 0–415–10296–0.

Jeffrey Weeks, Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty, (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995). xiii+209pp. ISBN 0–7456–1369–1.

Angelia R. Wilson (ed), A Simple Matter of Justice? Theorising Lesbian and Gay Politics, (Cassell, London 1995). xi+226pp. ISBN 0–304–32955‐X.     

The Politics of Public–Private Partnerships

Since 1 May 1997 the Labour government in the United Kingdom has implemented a number of public–private partnerships (PPPs) as a central tool of governance within their wider modernisation agenda. To date, the introduction of PPPs has largely been evaluated through conceptual lenses that emphasise either the administrative, managerial, financial or technical dimensions of this reform strategy. This article seeks to complement this wider literature by arguing that PPPs raise a host of political issues and tensions that have largely been overlooked. Five specific themes are set out in order to provide a framework or organising perspective. These are: efficiency; risk; complexity; accountability; and governance and the future of state projects. The main conclusion of the article is that PPPs represent a Faustian bargain in that forms of PPP may deliver efficiency gains and service improvements in some policy areas but these benefits may involve substantial political and democratic costs.