The Negotiability of Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange in the Time of Chief Justice Holt

This paper explores the development of bills of exchange and promissory notes in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It will be argued that the early law of negotiability was founded on a principled interpretation of the common law and that parliament's eventual rejection of this law resulted in a half-century of confusion. This time period, however, was fundamental in the development of the modern principle of negotiability as the courts struggled to create a workable framework for the transfer of written instruments. This paper examines the early conceptual difficulty of transferring written instruments and studies why bills of exchange were capable of transfer, despite the common law's bar on the assignment of choses in action, whereas promissory notes were not considered transferable at common law prior to the eighteenth century. The most important figure for the development of this area was Chief Justice Holt, whose legal interpretation of the transferability of bills of exchange was based on clearly defined and long-standing principles of common law. This interpretation of the common law was viewed as a hindrance to trade, and in response to Holt CJ's decisions, parliament passed the Statute of Anne 1704, allowing promissory notes to be transferable in the same manner as bills of exchange. This began to collapse the distinction between bills of exchange and promissory notes, which created numerous conceptual difficulties in the law of negotiable instruments. It was not until the case of Grant v Vaughan, heard in 1764, that the courts fully developed a new framework for the negotiability of written instruments. This early law displays the difficulty that courts had in developing the underlying principles of the assignment of written instruments, and deciphering its development is fundamental in understanding the modern principle of negotiability.     

Failed Arbitrations before the Court of Common Pleas: Cases Relating to London and Londoners, 1400–1468

This article uses data gathered by the University of London, Centre for Metropolitan History's recent project ‘Londoners and the Law: Pleadings in the Court of Common Pleas’, which sampled London-related cases pleaded before the fifteenth-century court of Common Pleas, to analyze the use of arbitration by sub-gentry and mercantile class disputants. It examines the relationship between arbitration and litigation at common law, the volume of London-related cases pleaded at common law which cited a prior failed arbitration, and in what types of disputes arbitration was employed. It presents the hypothesis that the use of arbitration by sub-gentry and mercantile class disputants in cases relating to London and Londoners may have declined between 1400 and 1468, and that arbitration was most widely used in certain types of multifaceted and exceptional disputes. This article tentatively suggests that developments in disputants' use of common law remedies may have related to changes in the frequency with which arbitration was employed, calling for further study.     

The discipline of difference: Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and corporal punishment

The minority threat hypothesis contends that growth in the size of a given minority population along with the ensuing competition for social and political resources will threaten existing social power arrangements. Regarding punishment specifically, the hypothesis states that dominant groups will support coercive measures to keep minority populations sufficiently oppressed. Using the minority threat hypothesis as our theoretical foundation, we posit that the more heterogeneous a population, the more social control will be necessary to maintain societal equilibrium for those in power. In effect a more personal, physical, and visceral response to criminal behavior will be deemed necessary in countries with high levels of fractionalization. This more focused form of social discipline will manifest as corporal punishment. Comparing modalities of punishment against varying population characteristics, we find that countries with higher levels of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization are more likely to employ corporal punishment against criminal offenders.     

Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks

Although empirical research has generally demonstrated that democracies experience more terrorism than autocracies, research suggests that this depends upon complex institutional differences that go beyond the democracy‐autocracy divide. This study examines these differences, linking institutions to strategies of coercion and co‐optation. Using zero‐inflated negative binomial regression estimations on Geddes’ (2003) autocratic regime‐type data for 161 countries between 1970 and 2006, we find that single‐party authoritarian regimes consistently experience less domestic and international terrorism relative to military autocracies and democracies. This finding is robust to a large number of specifications, underscoring the explanatory power of regime type for predicting terrorism. Our explanation for these findings is that party‐based autocracies have a wider range of coercion and co‐option strategies that they can employ to address grievance and dissent than do other, more strategically restricted, regimes.     

A Framework for Dynamic Causal Inference in Political Science

Dynamic strategies are an essential part of politics. In the context of campaigns, for example, candidates continuously recalibrate their campaign strategy in response to polls and opponent actions. Traditional causal inference methods, however, assume that these dynamic decisions are made all at once, an assumption that forces a choice between omitted variable bias and posttreatment bias. Thus, these kinds of “single‐shot” causal inference methods are inappropriate for dynamic processes like campaigns. I resolve this dilemma by adapting methods from biostatistics, thereby presenting a holistic framework for dynamic causal inference. I then use this method to estimate the effectiveness of an inherently dynamic process: a candidate’s decision to “go negative.” Drawing on U.S. statewide elections (2000–2006), I find, in contrast to the previous literature and alternative methods, that negative advertising is an effective strategy for nonincumbents. I also describe a set of diagnostic tools and an approach to sensitivity analysis.     

Response to Cilluffo and Gergely

Research on the motives of those who engage in small group political violence typically takes a qualitative or quantitative form. I argue that researchers should seek to understand why people engage in small group political violence, and that the best way to achieve such understanding is to employ both. The advantages of this approach are discussed in this paper, as is the importance of recognizing that the activities of all actors in any given violent location, including state actors, should be accounted for in research.     

Public Support for Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia

Abstract

The transition and consolidation of democracy in Southeast Asia has proven fragile and tenuous some 30 years after the current wave of democratization began. A critical ingredient in the process of democratization is the role of public opinion and the extent that the public supports the democratic ‘rules of the game’. This study uses 2006 and 2007 public opinion data from the AsiaBarometer Survey of six Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Singapore) to examine popular perceptions of democracy and democratic principles and practices. Specifically, it seeks to shed light on the following interrelated questions: Do democratic institutions in Southeast Asia work well in the short and long term? To what extent are citizens in these countries satisfied with various political and civil freedoms? Do citizens trust specific institutions to operate in the best interests of their society? Does the current political system and government perform well?     

Does substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Surprising evidence from Africa

A growing body of evidence holds that citizens support democracy when they believe the regime has provided individual freedoms and political rights. Put simply, citizens develop legitimacy attitudes by learning about democracy. These findings, however, are based on citizens' evaluations of the procedural elements of democracy. Democratization also entails substantive reforms that likely impact legitimacy attitudes. This article provides the first test of how the success – and failure – of substantive democratization shapes legitimacy attitudes. Using data from the second round of Afrobarometer surveys, I find surprising results. Citizens who judge the regime to be more successful in substantive democratization are actually less likely to be committed democrats. I conclude with possible explanations of these surprising findings and reflect on the challenges for both future research and for the new democracies facing this situation.     

The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion,the Separation of Powers,and the U.S. Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation

Numerous studies have found that elite and popular preferences influence decision making on the U.S. Supreme Court; yet, uncertainty remains about when, how, and why the Court is constrained by external pressure. I argue the justices are constrained, at least in part, because they fear nonimplementation of their decisions. I test this theory by utilizing a recent study of judicial power, which finds the Court enjoys greater implementation power in “vertical” cases (those involving criminal and civil liability) than in “lateral” cases (all others; e.g., those involving schools or government agencies). I find that Court constraint is strongest in important lateral cases—those cases in which implementation depends on support from nonjudicial actors. My findings suggest that Supreme Court constraint is driven by the justices' fear of nonimplementation and is, therefore, dependent on institutional context.