Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists

The conventional wisdom is that terrorists tend to target democracies because they are uniquely vulnerable to coercion. Terrorists are able to coerce democracies into acceding to their policy demands because liberal countries suffer from two inherent counterterrorism constraints: (1) the commitment to civil liberties prevents democracies from adopting sufficiently harsh countermeasures to eradicate the terrorism threat, and (2) their low civilian cost tolerance limits their ability to withstand attacks on their civilian populations. This article tests both propositions of the conventional wisdom that (a) terrorists attack democracies over other regime types because (b) liberal constraints render democracies vulnerable to coercion. The data do not sustain either proposition: illiberal countries are the victims of a disproportionate number of terrorist incidents and fatalities, and liberal countries are substantially less likely to make policy concessions to terrorists, particularly on issues of maximal importance. A plausibility probe is then developed to explain why democracies have a superior track record against terrorists. The basic argument is that liberal countries are comparatively resistant to coercion—and hence inferior targets—because they are superior counterterrorists. Liberalism's commitment to civil liberties and low civilian cost tolerance are, in the aggregate, actually strategic assets that help democracies prevail in counterterrorist campaigns, thereby reducing the incentives for terrorists to target this regime type. These findings have important implications for how democracies can defend their liberal values and physical security in the age of terrorism.     

Unforeseen and Unaccounted: the European Union,the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland,peacebuilding, and accountability

This article examines the case of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland's (CFNI) experience as a primary recipient of peacebuilding aid from the European Union (EU) under the Special EU Programmes Body Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (SEUPB-EUSSPPR). The case serves as a lens into the tensions that such efforts create for community-based organizations as they seek both to honor their funder's accountability claims and their own needs to ensure legitimacy and efficacy with those with whom they interact so as to secure space and discretion to seek to catalyze social experimentation and learning. This paper argues the Foundation's experience and frustrations with EU accountability claims point up a difficulty with the SEUPB's comprehensive conceptualization of peacebuilding: It tends in practice to favor Union-prescribed aims and objectives over those its ‘partners’ derive from their daily efforts.     

Wissenserklärung im Verbandsprozess

Der Unterlassungsanspruch des § 28 Abs 1 KSchG richtet sich gegen gesetzwidrige Vertragsbestimmungen. Eine Vertragsbestimmung liegt aber nicht vor, wenn der Kunde lediglich best?tigt, die Ware vollst?ndig erhalten zu haben. Es wird zwischen den Parteien nichts geregelt, der Kunde gibt keine Willenserkl?rung ab, die den Vertrag gestaltet. Durch seine Best?tigung wird lediglich ein Beweismittel geschaffen, das der richterlichen Beweiswürdigung im Individualverfahren unterliegt. Das Gesetz selbst untersagt im § 6 Abs 1 Z 11 KSchG nur für den Verbraucher nachteilige Vereinbarungen über die Beweislast, w?hrend durch eine Wissenserkl?rung die Beweislastverteilung nicht vertraglich abge?ndert wird. Die Wissenserkl?rung sagt lediglich aus, wovon der Erkl?rende im Zeitpunkt der Erkl?rung ausgegangenist. Dies im übrigen auch nur dann, wenn der Erkl?rende die Erkl?rung bewusst abgegeben und nicht nur eine ungelesene Urkunde unterfertigte. Die Klausel "Vollst?ndig erhalten:" unterliegt nicht der Inhaltskontrolle nach § 28 Abs 1 KSchG und stellt keine Beweislastverschiebung zu Lasten des Verbrauchers im Sinne des § 6 Abs 1 Z 11 KSchG dar. Ma?geblich für die Qualifikation einer Klausel als eigenst?ndig im Sinne des § 6 KSchG ist nicht die Gliederung des Klauselwerks; es k?nnen vielmehr auch zwei unabh?ngige Regelungen in einem Punkt oder sogar in einem Satz der Allgemeinen Gesch?ftsbedingungen enthalten sein. Es kommt vielmehr darauf an, ob ein materiell eigenst?ndiger Regelungsbereich vorliegt. Dies ist dann der Fall, wenn die Bestimmungen isoliert voneinander wahrgenommen werden k?nnen.     

A content analysis of fingerprint literature for educational curricula

Forensic science is being required to justify and elucidate its scientific foundations. One way of doing this is through academic curricula. For many native forensic sciences, these curricula do not exist. A content analysis of nine major books in fingerprints was conducted to develop a structure for curricula in that field. The results of this study can be used to organize course content and serve as a model for other disciplines with published materials but no coherent or standard curricula.