Peace-building and the predatory political economy of insecurity: evidence from Cambodia,East Timor and Afghanistan

International peace-building interventions in post-conflict countries are intended to transform the socio-political context that led to violence and thereby build a stable and lasting peace. Yet the UN's transitional governance approach to peace-building is ill-suited to the challenge of dealing with the predatory political economy of insecurity that often emerges in post-conflict societies. Evidence from peace-building attempts in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan illustrates that the political economy incentives facing domestic elites in an environment of low credibility and weak institutionalisation lead to a cycle of patronage generation and distribution that undermine legitimate and effective governance. As a result, post-conflict countries are left vulnerable to renewed conflict and persistent insecurity. International interventions can only craft lasting peace by understanding the political economy of conflict persistence and the potential policy levers for altering, rather than perpetuating, those dynamics.     

Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial Review

The role of the courts in the review of administrative rulemaking raises profound questions as to the legitimate interference of courts in the exercise of administrative activities, which are often carried out in the pursuance of a legislative mandate. In contrast to the review of administrative acts of individual application, the Union courts have shown a more hesitant approach in the review of administrative rulemaking activities. This contribution will discuss the review by the Union courts of administrative rulemaking for compliance with procedural as well as substantive standards and will explore whether a convincing rationale for their more deferential attitude to the review of administrative rules can be provided. The article will explore to what extent lessons can be learned from the jurisprudence of the federal courts in the USA, which have struggled, even after the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), with similar problems.     

Using Data Combination of Fundamental Variable-Based Forecasts and Poll-Based Forecasts to Predict the 2013 German Election

In this paper I present an election forecasting approach to predict the vote share of the governing coalition in German national elections. The model is composed of two independent prediction components: the first is based on poll data, the second on fundamental variables. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages when used in isolation. The basic idea is to use both and find a better informed overall forecast. The predictions are combined using a shrinkage estimator, where the predictions are weighted by their respective prediction uncertainty. The uncertainty of the poll prediction is modelled time-dependent. The result is a dynamic model allowing for predictions longer before the elections highly relying on fundamental variables. With the elections coming closer predictions rely more and more on the polling data.     

The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment

What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that firms are best prepared to face abroad. We test our predictions using multiple data sets at different levels of analysis: firm‐level data on MNEs' foreign subsidiaries, data on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) positions, and longitudinal data on bilateral FDI flows. We find that states with independent judiciaries are particularly attractive to investment from countries also possessing independent courts. Similarly, countries with low judicial independence disproportionately send FDI to countries lacking independent judiciaries. These findings' implications challenge conventional wisdom: “Good” institutions may not attract all investors, and “bad” institutions may not always deter, as current research suggests.