不同条件下Percoll密度梯度离心分离组织细胞浮游生物的比较

目的实验评估不同条件下Percoll密度梯度离心分离组织中浮游生物的效果。方法大白兔肝组织匀浆后与3种藻类混合物混匀,分为混匀高速分离组、混匀低速分离组、叠加高速分离组、叠加低速分离组和未分离组(对照组)进行Percoll密度梯度离心分离浮游生物,镜检并提取其DNA,用PCR技术分别检测浮游生物16S rDNA和叶绿素基因特异性片段。结果混匀高速分离组有较多浮游生物呈分层条纹状分布于离心管中部,叠加高速分离组浮游生物紧邻组织细胞层下,低速分离组见较少浮游生物紧邻于组织细胞层之下,未分离组见浮游生物和组织细胞混杂沉于管底;经DNA检测,各分离组组织细胞层下液体均可检出浮游生物的1条447bp 16S rDNA片段及1条194bp叶绿体/叶绿素脱辅基蛋白基因片段,未分离组均未检出扩增产物且背景较深。结论混匀加样方式进行高速Percoll密度梯度离心,合并收集组织细胞层下所有液体,是分离浮游生物的最有效方法。     

利多卡因硬膜外麻醉和静脉注射致死的动物模型

目的建立利多卡因硬膜外麻醉和静脉注射致死的动物模型。方法本地杂种犬18只其中6只经硬膜外腔、6只经股静脉注射利多卡因(63.35mg/kg体重),对照组3只经硬膜外腔、3只经股静脉按注射生理盐水(3.2ml/kg体重)。观察动物致死过程的生命体征变化及死后各组织器官的病理改变特点。结果硬膜外麻醉致死犬心电、血压和呼吸消失的平均时间分别为28 min(22~45 min)、23.6 min(20~42 min)、22 min(18~35 min);静脉注射致死犬血压、心电和呼吸消失的平均时间分别为6.5 min(5~8min)、8 min(6~10min)、7.2 min(4~9min);各器官病理改变均呈淤血、水肿等征象。结论该模型实验动物的表现和生命特征变化符合椎管内麻醉中毒、致死的表现,可用于利多卡因麻醉意外致死案件的法医学鉴定研究。     

The heart of Asia and the roof of the world

This article concentrates almost entirely on the events of 1971 and the author's involvement in the “sometimes complicated and frustrating negotiations and consultations” which led up to the signing at the end of 1971 of the various Treaties of Friendship as Britain withdrew from the Gulf, leaving behind a number of independent states, including the United Arab Emirates.     

Managerialist advocate or “control freak”? The Janus‐faced Office of the Auditor General

Abstract: This article highlights the contradictions in the role of the Office of Auditor General (OAG) and identifies the sources as well as the consequences of the office's Janus‐like character as both a managerialist advocate and “control freak.” This character, it is argued, is shaped by institutional factors and the knowledge‐basis on which the office relies to fulfil its mission. Three causes of “institutional schizophrenia” are identified: the OAG'S mandate in relation to financial and value‐for‐money audit (VFMA); the combination of the OAG'S institutional permeability and the structure of the management consulting market; and the tensions between the “negative” and “positive” dimensions of the office's mandate. On the consequences side, the author discusses three elements: the limited capacity of the OAG to develop a coherent position about managerialism; the fact that the advocacy of managerialist principles is drawing the OAG closer into the political realm; and the fragility of professionalism as a mechanism for regulating the management consultant's role of the OAG in relation to VFMA. Sommaire: Le but de cet article est de mettre en relief les contradictions dans le rôle du Bureau du vérificateur général (BVG) et d'identifier les causes et les conséquences du caractére schizoïde du Bureau qui est à la fois partisan du managérialisme et obsédé du contrôle. Ce caractère spécifique du Bureau est façonné par des facteurs institutionnels et le type de connaissance dont il dépend pour remplir sa mission. Trois causes de schizophrénie institutionnelle sont identifées:le mandat du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification financière et l'optimisation des ressources; l'interaction entre la perméabilité institutionnelle du Bureau et la structure du marché du conseil en management; et les tensions entre les dimensions positives et négatives du mandat du Bureau. En ce qui conceme les conséquences, cet article aborde trois aspects:l'incapacité du BVG À développer une position cohérente à l'endroit du managérialisme; le fait que la promotion d'idées managérialistes amène le BVG À s'impliquer dans la sphère politique, et la fragilité du professionalisme en tant que comme mécanisme pour réguler le rôle de consultant du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification d'optimisation des ressources.     

Interests,Instruments and Institutional Preferences in the EU Comitology System: The 2006 Comitology Reform

This paper seeks to reveal the institutional interests of the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission in the comitology system. This is done by an investigation of the 2006 comitology reform, which introduced the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This reform was the result of developments in four areas: the Lamfalussy reform in the area of financial regulation; the controversial use of comitology in the area of GMOs, food safety and the environment; the failed Constitutional Treaty; and the amending of the 1999 comitology decision. The analysis shows that the reform was the result of a two‐dimensional constitutional struggle. The first dimension concerns the relative supervisory position of the two legislative actors, the Council and the European Parliament. The second dimension concerns the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch of the EU system. In theoretical terms, the analysis demonstrates an example of T.M. Moe's ‘politics of structural choice’. The paper ends by drawing lessons for the negotiations on the new comitology system following the Lisbon Treaty.