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MICHAEL LAVER KENNETH BENOIT & NICOLAS SAUGER 《European Journal of Political Research》2006,45(4):667-697
Abstract. The French two-round system of presidential elections forces candidates to choose strategies designed to maximize their votes in two different, potentially conflicting strategic contexts: a first round contest between many candidates, and a second round between (typically) a left- and a right-oriented candidate. Following a constitutional change in 2000, furthermore, presidential elections are synchronized with legislative elections, more tightly linking presidential candidates to the policy platforms of the parties they represent. This article examines the consequences of policy positioning by presidential candidates, measuring, comparing and assessing positioning in the legislative elections and in the first and second presidential election rounds. The measures come from an expert survey taken in 2002, from content analysis of party manifestos and presidential speeches, and from the 2002 French National Election Survey. The findings provide hard empirical confirmation of two commonly perceived propositions: first, that Jospin's first-round loss resulted from strategic error in moving too close to the policy centre, and second, that Chirac's won an overwhelming second-round victory because he collected all of the voters from candidates eliminated in the first round. 相似文献
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Historically, liberal democracy was born as a means to curb the power of kings and tyrants through mechanisms that would ensure accountability and consent of the governed. A system of checks and balances—two legislative chambers, executive and independent courts—were instituted to ensure power did not become too concentrated. Today's highly diverse, mass consumer societies, however, have presented another set of challenges. Power is so diffused governance is becoming ineffective. The short‐term mentality of voters and the lobbying of special interests undermine the ability of democracies to focus on the long‐term and the common interest. Because there are more checks than balances, gridlock has supplanted consensus. In this section, we compare Chinese and Western systems on their ability to deliver good governance. The editors of the Economist magazine put the debate in historical context. 相似文献