The impact of protective shields and videotape testimony on conviction rates in a simulated trial of child sexual abuse

In Experiment 1 mock jurors watched a videotape simulation of a sexual abuse trial that included a 10-year-old child witness testifying in one of three different modalities: (1) The child testified in court while directly confronting the defendant (open court condition). (2) The child testified in court with a protective shield placed between the child and the defendant (shield condition). (3) The child testified outside the courtroom and the child's testimony was presented to the jury and the defendant on a video monitor (video condition). The mock jurors judged the guilt of the defendant after watching the entire trial. The modality of the child's testimony had no impact on conviction rates. In Experiment 2 subjects watched the same trial that was used in Experiment 1. The trial was stopped immediately after the child testified (the child was the first witness to take the stand), and subjects judged the guilt of the defendant. The modality of the child's testimony had a significant impact on conviction rates. Subjects in the open court condition were more likely to convict the defendant than subjects in the shield and videotape conditions. These findings are relevant to Supreme Court decisions regarding the use of protective devices with child witnesses.     

Positivism,pragmatism, and everyday life

Steven Ross teaches philosophy at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.     

"对欧洲一体化和东亚合作的再思考"会议综述

为研究欧洲和亚洲的新形势和地区一体化进程的最新进展,亚欧基金会(ASEF)、外交学院(CFAU)与中国国际关系学会(CNAIS)于2006年11月13-14日在中国北京共同组织了为期两天的题为“对欧洲一体化和东亚合作的再思考”的会议。来自39个亚欧会议成员国的近70名学者、政府官员和记者与会。会议开幕式由外交学院常务副院长秦亚青教授主持,中国外交部国际司吴海龙司长和亚欧基金会执行主席赵源一(Wonil Cho)大使致开幕词。欧洲委员会驻华代表团团长赛日·安博(Serge Abou)大使发表了主旨演讲,论述了欧洲地区一体化进程中政治和制度层面的问题…     

Cutting Public Expenditures in Advanced Industrial Democracies: The Importance of Avoiding Blame

This article examines three conditions for cutting public expenditures across a sample of 16 advanced industrial democracies: intent, ability, and need during the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike spending increases, cuts require purposeful action. A first condition, therefore, for cutting expenditures is that leaders intend to curb spending. Surprisingly, the results indicate that leftist parties are considerably more effective at cutting expenditures than parties of the right. Indeed, leaders appear to have most latitude when a feared course of action is considered least likely. A second condition is that of ability. Institutions constrain and facilitate leadership. The degree to which decision-making must be shared within the executive both helps and hinders budget-cutting across exogenous conditions. While oversized coalitions may impede losses, they may also facilitate them by sharing responsibility for unpopular measures and thus reducing electoral repercussions. Indeed, both party and institutional results point to the centrality of avoiding blame in the loss‐inducing process. A third condition for cutting public expenditures involves need. While objective economic indicators are not irrelevant, the issue of need is largely politically defined.     

Is Democracy Good for the Poor?

Many scholars claim that democracy improves the welfare of the poor. This article uses data on infant and child mortality to challenge this claim. Cross-national studies tend to exclude from their samples nondemocratic states that have performed well; this leads to the mistaken inference that nondemocracies have worse records than democracies. Once these and other flaws are corrected, democracy has little or no effect on infant and child mortality rates. Democracies spend more money on education and health than nondemocracies, but these benefits seem to accrue to middle- and upper-income groups.