Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one‐third. Further, we show that the results obtained by Segal are the product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. We also discuss how our estimation highlights the usefulness of Krehbiel's model of legislative decision making.     

Elite-public interaction on twitter: EU issue expansion in the campaign

Why do some issues receive more interest from the public, while others do not? This paper develops a theoretical and empirical approach that explains the degree to which issues expand from the elite to the public. We examine how candidates in the 2014 European Parliament elections talked about EU issues, in comparison to other political issues. We rely on data collected from Twitter and use a combination of human coding and machine learning to analyse what facilitates interactions from the public. We find that most political actors did not try to engage with the public about EU issues, and lack of engagement results in less interactions from the general public. Our findings contribute to understanding why EU issues still play a secondary role in European politics, but at the same time highlight what low-cost communicational tools might be useful to overcome this expansion deficit.     

Some Remarks on the Notions of Legal Order and Legal System

Abstract
In this paper, the authors discuss some problems related to the existence and identity of legal norms and legal systems. Firstly, two criteria for identification of legal norms are analyzed: linguistic criteria and non-linguistic criteria. Secondly, the dynamics of legal systems and the distinction between legal system and legal order are examined (close to Raz's distinction between momentary legal system and legal system). Based on the logical relations of membership and inclusion, two ways of analysing the change of legal systems are suggested. Thirdly, a criterion for identification of legal orders (from Bulygin) is discussed and it is shown that this criterion does not explain adequately, on the one hand, the existence of some norms, i.e., customary norms; and, on the other, the existence of invalid norms; i.e., unconstitutional norms. The main conclusions of this paper are: (a) the concepts of legal system and legal order could not explain the existence of law in a given society; (b) the concepts of legal system and legal order could be considered models of rational normative systems.