MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES IN PUBLIC SERVICE CONTRACTING: LESSONS IN GREEN‐SPACE MANAGEMENT

In this article, we address a series of interrelated issues in the managerial challenge of public service contracting. This is done by prompting ten issues within four objectives and highlighting their relevance and potential interrelatedness in effective contract management. In contrast to prevalent piecemeal and theoretically one‐dimensional approaches, the objectives and issues constitute a holistic framework that advances a comprehensive and pragmatic understanding of contracting processes. We hope that the framework merits further in‐depth exploration that may generate new insights, themes and questions for research in public service contracting. We identify and exemplify the framework by combining insights from different theoretical perspectives with empirical evidence through an iterative process. The evidence is educed as a set of observed and self‐reported stories in a cross‐national sample of 15 cases of contracting‐out in urban green‐space management.     

AGENCIFICATION AND BLAME SHIFTING: EVALUATING A NEGLECTED SIDE OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS

The establishment of autonomous agencies has been a strong trend in the public sector across countries for about 25 years. In line with the official rhetoric accompanying such reforms, almost all reform evaluations have focused on various kinds of performance improvements. This article investigates a set of behavioural consequences of such reforms, which have been claimed by the blame avoidance literature, but have never been subjected to systematic empirical analysis. In particular, the article examines how a reform of agencification influences the propensity of agency managers to blame the political principals when the agency is subject to public criticism. Furthermore, it examines how the reform influences the blaming rhetoric of ministers and MPs. To evaluate such reform effects systematically, the article introduces a new empirical approach and illustrates the utility of the approach in a case study of the transformation of the national Danish railway company from 1995 to 2007.     

Industrial Relations and the Limits of the State: Can a Left Labour Government Resurrect Comprehensive Sectoral Collective Bargaining and Restore Trade Union Power?

Since 2017 the British Labour Party has proposed mandatory sectoral collective bargaining (SCB) as a comprehensive strategy to rebuild the trade union voice across the entire economy. The intellectual roots lie in the Institute of Employment Rights’ (IER) Manifesto for Labour Law (2016). First, this article explains the core IER approach, questioning its feasibility given current low levels of union membership and bargaining coverage and whether it would produce the stable and productive economy promised. Second, the article develops four social science objections to this state-driven approach centred on industrial relations history; political sociology; economics; and political philosophy. The conclusion argues that while stronger voluntary trade unions could help, it is neither practicable nor desirable for the state to impose a trade union, single-channel approach to employee voice. Instead, a ‘mixed economy of voice’ is proposed, perhaps including statutory works councils, which speaks directly to all employees—union and non-union—and wins broader political, employer and public support.     

Politics by Other Means in South Africa Today

Rick Abel's classic Politics by Other Means (1995) used South Africa to argue for law's ‘potential nobility’, but it did so avoiding a heroic mode characteristic of much anti-apartheid writing. Abel showed how law could, with strenuous exertion, be turned into a defensive shield for the oppressed. As a sword, however, it was ‘two-edged’. It allowed the powerful to frustrate or overturn hard-won symbolic victories. Recently, the heroic mode has returned to South Africa. The Constitutional Court, in particular, is lauded for having combated ‘state capture’ under deposed President Jacob Zuma. A closer examination of this period, however, does much to vindicate Abel's earlier scepticism about law's offensive value. The spectacular deployment of law to fight politicians’ crimes has exposed the judiciary to unexpected political threats. Meanwhile, civil society's efforts to entrust judges with administrative duties shirked by the government has inevitably entailed the sacrifice of some rule of law values.     

INDIVIDUAL STABILITY OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADULTHOOD: TESTING THE STABILITY POSTULATE OF MOFFITT'S DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY*

This paper presents a test of Moffitt's (1993) prediction on the stability of longitudinal antisocial behavior, using data from the South‐Holland Study. Aggressive (overt) and non‐aggressive antisocial (covert) behaviors were measured when subjects were 6–11 years old, and at follow‐ups when they were 12–17 years old and 20–25 years old. In accordance with the postulate, we did find a higher level of stability of overt behavior from childhood to adulthood, compared with childhood to adolescence, especially in combination with early manifestations of status violations and/or covert behavior in childhood. Results related to the stability of covert behavior were not in accordance with the prediction, but did support the recently proposed adjustment to the starting age of the adult phase.     

MODELLING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL BUDGET SECTOR 1982-1992

A substantial literature exists on the economic analysis of bureaucracy, which includes formal models of bureaucratic behaviour by Niskanen (1971) and Dunleavy (1991). This article develops hypotheses from those models about changes in size of bureaux over time and tests them against data on the Australian federal budget sector in 1982–83 and 1991–92. The models predict that bureaucrats usually will be able to influence the size or structure of their bureaux in line with their personal preferences. However, the Australian data suggest that the extent of such influence may be less than is assumed in either model and that the preferences of politicians are more influential than the models allow. One conclusion is that, if bureaucracy is to be modelled, a principal-agent approach will have more to offer than the neo-classical maximizing framework adopted by Niskanen in particular. A further conclusion, at odds with those of Niskanen and weakening his case for wholesale privatization, is that bureaucratic dysfunctions may be amenable to reform of the political and bureaucratic rules and systems.