MENTAL HEALTH AND JUVENILE ARRESTS: CRIMINALITY,CRIMINALIZATION, OR COMPASSION?*

Juveniles in secure confinement allegedly suffer from more mental health problems than their peers. This may reflect background and behavioral characteristics commonly found in clients of both mental health and juvenile justice systems. Another explanation is that mental disorders increase the risk of arrest. These interpretations were tested on a sample of Pittsburgh boys (n = 736). Findings indicate that arrested youth exhibit more attention deficit hyperactivity (ADH) problems, oppositional defiant (OD) problems, and nondelinquent externalizing symptoms prior to their first arrests compared to their never‐arrested peers. However, arrested and nonarrested youth score similarly on prior affective and anxiety problems and internalizing symptoms. Net of delinquency, substance use, and other selection factors, internalizing problems lower the risk of subsequent arrest, whereas OD problems and nondelinquent externalizing symptoms increase it. ADH problems have no effect on arrest net of delinquency and substance use. These findings lend only partial support to the criminalization hypothesis. Whereas some mental health symptoms increase the risk of arrest, others elicit more cautious or compassionate official responses.     

HEREDITY AND CRIME: BAD GENES OR BAD RESEARCH?*

This review of the research literature on the heritability of criminal behavior organizes the studies by four basic research methodologies: family studies, twin studies, adoption studies, and gene-environment interaction studies. Interpretation of the relationships observed in these studies is made ambiguous and problematic by critical methodological inadequacies in the research itself: The methodological Jaws notwithstanding, the research evidence does seem to suggest the existence of a fairly consistent relationship between heredity and criminal behavior. Recommendations concerning the future direction of research in this area are discussed.     

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TRIAL COURT ELECTIONS: Possibilities for Accentuating the Positive and Eliminating the Negative

A large part of the debate over state judicial selection has focused upon the lack of voter interest in and knowledge about judicial elections. This study investigates voter participation in the contested nonpartisan elections for California Superior Court judge from 1958–1978. Focusing upon the variations among and within the state's counties, the analysis attempts to assess the contributions of sociological, environmental, and institutional variables to the level of participation. An exploration of the policy implications of the findings suggests, among other things, that judicial elections in large metropolitan areas might well be abandoned and replaced with some system of gubernatorial appointment and reappointment of judges.     

PUBLIC SECTOR PAY BARGAINING: COMPARABILITY, DECENTRALIZATION AND CONTROL

Public sector pay, as a key component of public expenditure, has been a major issue for government since the mid-1970s. This article analyses public services pay bargaining since 1979 and examines the continuing tension between the control of public sector pay levels on the one hand and the wish to make pay levels more responsive to external market forces on the other.
The article concentrates on the changes in pay bargaining in the public services. It does not purport to provide a detailed economic analysis of the outcomes of the various phases in public sector pay policy, but does attempt to explain the process implications of the political contingencies and rationale driving government policy on pay determination. In particular it notes the resilience of national pay-setting arrangements and pay comparability throughout most of the period under review, despite the political rhetoric, emphasizing the pragmatism of government policy. The latter section of the article reviews the current policy, with its emphasis on decentralized pay determination, and considers these new developments within the context of private sector collective bargaining theory.
The evidence from the private sector suggests that pay determination in the private sector is complex and that levels of bargaining relate to various factors. Decentralization is neither a panacea for poor performance nor necessarily problem free. Devolved pay determination can lead to problems of control over costs and, in the context of high levels of trade union organization, to pay'leapfrogging'. The article concludes that there is a continuing contradiction between the role of the government as an employer, keen to devolve pay decisions to local level, and that of economic regulator with responsibility for the wider economy. This continuing tension indicates that decentralized pay bargaining in the public sector will be limited in its scope by some form of central government control.