The Dilemmas of Frontline Staff Working With the Homeless: Housing First,Discretion, and the Task Environment

This article examines staff discretion in permanent supportive housing facilities run by a nonprofit agency claiming to use a Housing First approach. Field observation, archival data, and individual and group interviews with staff and clients were examined to better understand agency processes involved in intake, sanctions, and disposal of clients to evaluate Housing First fidelity. In their day-to-day interactions with clients, frontline workers' discretion is affected by working conditions such as lack of resources and heavy workloads, as well as by demands placed on the agency by members of its task environment. Implications for Housing First programs and homeless clients are discussed.     

See No Evil,Hear No Evil? Assessing Corruption Risk Perceptions and Strategies of Victorian Public Bodies

This paper critically examines qualitative survey data from 36 Victorian public sector bodies on their perceptions of corruption risks, and strategies to mitigate these risks, as well as the integrity mechanisms in place. The findings indicate that even though corruption does not seem to be prevalent in these bodies it is not on their radar either, though fraud prevention was significantly present. The paper identifies international best practices of integrity management and inculcation of public service ethos in developed countries, and stresses three vital elements or pillars that combine both the ‘values’ and ‘compliance’ based approaches. These pillars are as follows: (1) specific corruption prevention programs and strategies that are additional to but complement existing anti‐fraud programs; (2) targeted anti‐corruption training, both for employees and for the public; and (3) effective leadership engagement and commitment to an ethical culture (Tone at the Top).     

The authoritarian logic of regulatory pluralism: Understanding China's new environmental actors

Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism.     

Firm entries and exits in Estonian urban municipalities: urban hinterlands and rural peripheries, 2005–2012

This paper studies firm entries and exits in Estonian urban areas, urban hinterlands, and rural peripheries following EU accession, and it analyzes the effects of changes in population density, employee income level, unemployment, and economic climate on firm entries and exits. It concludes that the firm entry rate exceeded the exit rate in all of the years between 2005 and 2012. The urban hinterland is characterized by the highest level of both entries and exits. The fixed-effect regression models show that income and recession, which are the most significant factors to impact on local entrepreneurship, have a similar effect on different municipality types.     

Show Them Your Teeth First!

This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation.     

Authority and Authorisation

The core of Kelsen's strong views onauthority emerging from his concept of law is this:Authority of law, authority in law andauthority about law are one and the same thing.The conceptual problems suggested by these threedifferent prepositions must and can be solved in onefell swoop. Kelsen's core view will first be probed bygiving an account of what is a promising approachoffered in a fairly early text, Das Problem derSouveränität, namely, what it means to`set' or `posit' the law. Inevitably, this leadsto an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one thatintends to accommodate as many Kelsenian emphases aspossible. The Grundnorm will be presented as ashield against hypostatising authority. From there,some characteristics will be inferred of the type ofauthority that arises from Kelsen's account of legalknowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically,authority without an author.