Mandates, Powers, and Policies

Elections provide a mandate to pursue a set of policies. Party label provides a concise ideological cue for voters to choose among candidates, and research on industrial democracies verifies a link between the parties voters elect and subsequent policy outcomes. The combination of inchoate party systems and economic vulnerability elsewhere may weaken the link between voter choice and policy. When examining economic policies in Latin America, there is some controversy as to whether governments carried out "reform by surprise"—promising one thing during a campaign while implementing another in office. We test whether the ideological reputations of executives' and legislators' parties explain whether they adopt market-oriented policies. We find that the future behavior of presidential candidates is difficult for voters to predict. However, the ideological reputation of legislators is a reliable predictor of policy outcomes, and the relationship is clarified by the prospects of collective action by legislative delegations.     

'Building a Better World'

Garran Oration Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia National Conference, 29 November -1 December 2003     

Security, Capacity and Post-Market Reforms: Public Management Change in 2003

Public sector change in 2003 was a product of external demands and internal pressures for improvement. The specific areas addressed are responses to security threats in the international environment; strengthening internal capacity, particularly through whole-of-government approaches; and fine-tuning the public management model in part through readjustments to the centre-agency relationship and greater emphasis on horizontal structures and processes.
This is the ninth year an administrative essay has been published in the journal since 1996. Earlier chronicles include: J. Stewart 55(1) 1996; S. Prasser 56(1) 1997; J. Homeshaw 57(3) 1998; J. Moon 58(2) 1999; J. Curtin 59(1) 2000; C. Broughton and J. Chalmers 60(1) 2001; N. Miragliotta 61(1) 2002; and J. Nettercote 62(1) 2003.
In this issue two chronicles are published — the first, by John Halligan and Jill Adams, focuses on external security and internal capacity building. The second assessment by Scott Prasser takes a different view of compliant management, poor decisions and reactive change.     

'Designing Better Health Care in the South': A Case Study of Unsuccessful Transformational Change in Public Sector Health Service Reform

This article presents a case study of a project known as 'Designing Better Health Care in the South' that attempted to transform four separately incorporated health services in southern Adelaide into a single regional health service. The project's efforts are examined using Kotter's (1996) model of the preconditions for transformational change in organisations and the areas in which it met or failed to meet these preconditions are analysed, using results from an evaluation that was commenced during the course of the attempted reform. The article provides valuable insights into an attempted major change by four public sector health organisations and the facilitators and barriers to such change. It also examines the way in which forces beyond the control of individual public sector agencies can significantly impact on attempts to implement organisational change in response to an identified need. This case study offers a rare glimpse into the micro detail of health care reform processes that are so widespread in contemporary health services but which are rarely systematically evaluated.     

The risky business of public–private partnerships

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are now a common strand of third way government policy, with better efficiency promised from the private funding of public infrastructure through the transfer of risks to private parties. This paper aims to investigate, on an empirical basis, the realities of risk transfers in PPPs and compare this experience against both the rhetoric of project proponents and the formal contract conditions. The paper outlines some conceptual frameworks underpinning PPPs and establishes the notions of risk shifting and risk sharing. The range of typical risks encountered in infrastructure projects is specially considered, and differences to traditional project delivery arrangements are articulated. Some empirical experience on the transfer of risks under PPPs is then outlined through a case study. This analysis shows the extent to which risks were shifted to the private parties as planned, or whether risks remained with government. It is argued that while commercial risks were largely well managed, governance risks were not. It is critical to understand better the nature of risk transfers in PPPs in view of the large financial implications of these deals along with long contract terms.     

Taking the Keys from Grandpa

Recent highly publicized traffic accidents involving older drivers have led to renewed interest in state policies and administrative practices that award and renew drivers’ licenses in the American states. Because the probability of traffic accidents is linked to the medical conditions that are more prevalent among the elderly, and because the number of older drivers is expected to rise over the next several decades, one might expect that this will be an increasingly important policy issue. This article discusses variations that are observed across states in law and administrative practice. A longitudinal analysis of data on crashes involving elderly drivers in fifteen states indicates that crash rates are directly related to the length of the renewal cycle for older drivers and inversely related to the stringency of testing at renewal. It is also likely that states requiring physicians to report conditions that would impair driving will experience lower crash rates. A secondary analysis of policy impacts on the licensing rates is not conclusive, a finding that is attributable to inaccuracies in the reported numbers of licensed drivers.     

Fiscal Institutions,Credit Ratings,and Borrowing Costs

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal institutions on state government borrowing costs. We find that institutions have both a direct and indirect effect on interest costs paid by state governments. Revenue limits are associated directly with higher interest costs; expenditure limits, stricter balanced budget rules, and restrictions on state debt issuance are indirectly associated with lower interest costs because they lead to higher credit ratings. It appears that investors and bond raters incorporate information on fiscal institutions into their assessment of state government credit quality.