Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making

Policy makers get information about the likely outcomes of policy options from experts before they make their decisions. In the executive branch, policy experts tend to reflect the views of the chief executive, whereas in the legislative branch members seek policy advisors whose views reflect their own. The result is a more diverse group of policy advisors in the legislative branch than in the executive branch, which under plausible conditions generates more accurate policy projections. Policy errors will tend to be smaller in legislative than in executive decision-making, providing an argument for making policy decisions in the legislative branch rather than the executive branch.     

Plaintiffs by proxy: A firm-level approach to WTO dispute resolution

Lobbying by multinational business firms drives the agenda of international trade politics. We match Fortune Global 500 firms to WTO disputes in which they have a stake and to their political activities using public disclosure data. The quantitative evidence reveals traces of a principal-agent relationship between major MNCs and the US Trade Representative (USTR). Firms lobby and make political contributions to induce the USTR to lodge a WTO dispute, and once a dispute begins, firms increase their political activity in order to keep USTR on track. Lobbying is overwhelmingly patriotic—the side opposing the US position is barely represented—and we see little evidence of MNCs lobbying against domestic protectionism. When the United States is targeted in a dispute, lobbying by defendant-side firms substantially delays settlement, as the affected firms pressure the government to reject concessions. Lobbying on the complainant side does not delay dispute resolution, as complainant-side firms have mixed incentives, to resolve disputes quickly as well as to hold out for better terms.     

Dimitriadis,G. (2003). Friendship,Cliques, and Gangs: Young Black Men Coming of Age in Urban America

No abstract available for this article.     

Why does government produce national defense?

Economists argue that government produces national defense because it is a public good, and markets fail to produce public goods optimally. This argument has two shortcomings. First, it relies on different assumptions of individual behavior in the private and public sectors. Second, it assumes that government has a comparative advantage in the production of public goods, despite evidence to the contrary. Employing the standard assumption of self-interested behavior for both private sector and public sector individuals, government has an incentive to produce national defense because by doing so it is protecting its source of income: its tax base. Incidentally, citizens benefit from the exchange of protection for tribute because their assets are protected.     

An estimation of the lag structure of the economic impact of an oil embargo

A number of economic models have been used to estimate the economic losses resulting from oil embargoes, but they have not been able to provide good answers about how quickly an economy would recover once the embargo was over. This study uses a phase lag analysis to estimate the lag structure of an embargo, and concludes that the major economic effects should be expected to disappear about six weeks after an embargo ends.The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Energy.