Same same but different. Die Feldtheorien Fligsteins und Bourdieus und das Potenzial einer wechselseitig informierten Perspektive für die Wirtschaftssoziologie

Field theoretical approaches have become popular within economic sociology. Many even consider the notion of ?field“ a suitable alternative to the hegemonic paradigm of ?embeddedness“. This article outlines the epistemological potential of a field theoretical perspective by systematically comparing the approaches of Neil Fligstein and Pierre Bourdieu. By examining their respective contexts of emergence, their theoretical and methodological references, their research interests and their central concepts, both similarities and differences between the two approaches become visible. The resulting insights allow for a field theoretical and profoundly relational perspective on economic phenomena that might stimulate ongoing debates within economic sociology.     

Rehumanizing Birth and Death in America

THESIS: Despite spending more on medical care than any other country in the world, the United States still boasts some of the worst patient outcomes of any developed nation. This disparity is especially true of how Americans give birth and die.  These natural human transitions have become catastrophically expensive and leave patients and their families traumatized from unnecessary interventions. This article examines the costs and outcomes associated with the medicalization of birth and death and argues that alternatives exist that improve patient outcomes while lowering costs. Access to these alternatives will require changing current regulatory and reimbursement structures and providing trained support staff to help families navigate beginning- and end-of life decisions.     

Treaty Commitment as a Signaling Device: Explaining the Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic,Social, and Cultural Rights

This study investigates the determinants of the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). To do so, it proposes an explanation that postulates that states employ treaty ratification as a device to signal their resolve to implement polices required by the treaty at issue in order to appease demanding domestic constituencies, predicting that states with lower compliance capacity tend to commit faster than states with higher compliance capacity. Applying this explanation to the ICESCR leads to two expectations. First, the larger government spending a proxy of high compliance capacity is hypothesized to delay the ratification process. Second, states with the unitary system are expected to ratify the ICESCR more promptly because the centralized power structure in unitary states significantly restricts the pursuit of the policy autonomy by minorities at local level that the right to self-determination entails. The Cox proportional hazard analysis lends support to both hypotheses.