The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe

This paper analyzes the public policies that lead to ‘`Katrina,’' paying particular attention to political decisions that created unusual risks in the New Orleans area. Most of the deaths from hurricane Katrina were concentrated in one place, New Orleans, and those losses arose in large part from its location in combination with its three century long effort to ‘`manage’' the risks associated with that location. Crisis management is inherently more error prone than ordinary policy making, because surprise implies the existence of significant information problems and urgency implies that time does not exist to completely address those problems (Congleton, 2005). In New Orleans the unavoidable mistakes of crisis management were compounded by policy choices made well before Katrina made landfall, as well as federalism, partisan politics, corruption, and incompetence.     

Who Owns What? Some Implications of the Humphry Report on Government Business Enterprises

Governments in Australia have long wrestled with the problem of managing the performance of government business enterprises (GBEs). In December 1996 the Finance Minister commissioned Richard Humphry to provide an 'internal review' of Commonwealth GBEs. While Humphry acknowledged the reality of many GBEs remaining in public hands for 'the foreseeable future', his report encouraged GBEs to be run more closely along private sector lines. According to Wettenhall, the long-term ramifications for Australia are significant, and the unique role, qualities and responsibilities of public ownership are in danger of being sidelined.     

The IPAA/University of Canberra Public Administration Research Fund

A report issued in 1996 commemorated the 10th Anniversary of this Fund, outlining its origins and purpose, briefly identifying the 21 recipients of grants from the Fund up to that time, and describing the projects for which the grants were awarded and outcomes of those grants (IPAA/UC 1996). The Fund has now run for more than another five years, and it is appropriate to report again on its activities; the Management Committee is grateful to the editors of AJPA for making space available for this report.     

Bureaucratic tenure and economic performance in centrally planned economies

Murrell and Olson (1991) set forth the hypothesis that in centrally planned economies economic interests over time become fragmented as bureaus become more autonomous and form into narrowly-based distributional coalitions. As a consequence, the national leader's encompassing interest in economic growth becomes compromised and growth begins to slow. This paper provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that growing bureaucratic autonomy results in declining economic growth in centrally planned economies.     

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS INNOVATORS*

Abstract: This article opens with a non-Australian example of innovation in local government. Next, attention is devoted to the concept and definition of “innovation”—necessary because the word has been used in many different and often confusing ways. Some illustrations of overseas research work on local government innovation are given. The paper then considers what is currently known about innovative practices in Australian local government management. It concludes by exploring the bases of innovative managerial activity and suggesting ways in which the capacity to innovate might be enhanced.