The law and practice in maritime boundary delimitation: lessons for the resolution of dispute between Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana

Definitions of terrorism in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries tend to provide that behaviour can constitute terrorism only if it is politically, religiously or ideologically motivated. Critics argue that this complicates prosecutions, distorts trials, and encourages racial profiling. Defenders argue that the requirement helps yield a definition which corresponds to common understandings of what terrorism entails, and limits the danger of terrorism‐related powers being abused. Part 1 of this article examines the antecedents of the requirement, part 2 examines its legal significance, and part 3 argues that it is unnecessary and undesirable. While many of the criticisms of the motivation requirement are either unpersuasive or exaggerated, defences of the requirement are not altogether convincing. While the requirement excludes from the definition some behaviour which ought not be treated as terrorism, it also excludes some socially dangerous activities which should be.     

Ideology and Anti‐Utopia

A recent film adaptation of Aldous Huxley’s novel, Brave New World, makes a number of seemingly minor changes in the novel’s characters, setting, and plot. Together, however, these changes transform the novel’s theme into its polar opposite. As a result, the dystopian novel is transmuted into an anti‐utopian film. After examining these changes in detail, I analyze the contrasting world views that lie behind the two texts and argue that they are based upon opposing views of human nature and society. I then reflect on the meaning of this transformation, arguing that it reflects a fundamental transformation in our society, one which undermines the possibility of using political action to attain social justice. Moreover, it is just this transformation which Huxley, in writing Brave New World, had hoped to warn us against.     

Evaluation of the ADViSOR project: Cross‐situational behaviour monitoring of high‐risk offenders in prison and the community

Purpose. The release on licence of prisoners who have committed serious violent and/or sexual offences requires rigorous risk assessment and risk management. This study evaluates the ADViSOR project, designed to examine the contribution of prison behaviour monitoring to community supervision of a sample of the highest risk offenders released in England and Wales under Multi‐Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). Method. The offence‐related behaviour of a total group (n= 25) of MAPPA prisoners in one prison, due for release in the following year to two adjacent probation trust areas, was monitored. Their behaviours in the community were followed up for 1 year. A comparison group (n= 36) was formed of the total number of MAPPA prisoners released from prisons nationally to the same two probation trusts. Results. The frequencies of ADViSOR negative behaviours in prison and the community were strongly correlated, r_s (25) = .55, p= .004, as were positive behaviours, r_s (25) = .56, p= .004. No statistically significant correlations were found either under usual MAPPA processes in the ADViSOR prison or comparison group prisons. The frequency of ADViSOR negative behaviours statistically significantly predicted, with 92% accuracy, the offenders who would reoffend or be recalled to prison (n= 8). Statistically significant similarities in types of behaviour were also identified. Conclusion. Results are discussed in terms of the contribution of behavioural monitoring to risk prediction with high‐risk offenders, consistency of cross‐situational behaviours, and implications for policy and practice.     

Electoral reform and the British MEP

After many years in which the subject was of marginal concern, electoral reform has recently become of central importance to politics in the UK. In this paper we examine the consequences for political representation of the electoral reform introduced in Britain for the 1999 elections to the European Parliament. We find that the immediate consequences of reform for the partisan balance and ‘representativeness’ of the British contingent in the EP were very much as expected. However, both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggest that the impact of reform on the representative priorities of British MEPs has been more partial, as parliamentarians have sought to adapt to the challenge of representing multi-member regions.     

The European parliament and the co‐decision procedure: A reassessment

In this paper, I reassess the co‐decision legislative procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Specifically, I examine the dispute as to whether co‐decision enhanced or diminished the European Parliament's influence over EU law making. Employing a combination of formal analysis of the different stages of the procedure and evidence from its actual operation, I argue that Garrett and Tsebelis’ claim that co‐decision reduces Parliament's legislative powers is both theoretically and empirically unsupported. The implications for the Parliament's position within European politics are evaluated in the conclusion.     

The Public Legitimacy of the National Assembly for Wales

This article examines the public legitimacy of the National Assembly for Wales. Both the Assembly and the broader system of devolved government for Wales initially enjoyed very limited public support. It is shown that support for devolution in general has risen substantially, while some elements of public attitudes towards the Assembly itself now appear distinctly positive. However, it is also demonstrated that public legitimacy, defined as ‘diffuse support’ for the Assembly, remains limited. The article then examines what factors explain levels of diffuse support for the National Assembly. It is found that variation in such support is best accounted for by factors associated with ‘non-material consequentialism’: perceptions of the impact of the Assembly on the process of government. The conclusion assesses the implications of the findings for the National Assembly, as well as for the study of devolution and political institutions more generally.     

Corporations and the Presumption of Innocence

Corporate behaviour is often regulated through the criminal law by means of reverse onus offences. Such offences are alleged to involve violations of the Presumption of Innocence. Such allegations almost always assume natural persons as defendants. The arguments supporting reverse onus offences are typically instrumental, to do with the importance of the social goals promoted and the ease of proof. The Presumption of Innocence is taken to be an autonomy right of natural persons and so not subject to being sidelined for reasons of law enforcement expediency. Corporations, however, are not natural persons: they have no autonomy right not to be treated as means. It may well be, then, that reverse onus offences are justified in the case of corporate defendants. I argue that the Presumption is not violated by such offences in the case of corporate defendants. I develop a broad concept of the criminal justice system as an allocative system, and argue that reverse onus offences properly allocate the burden of proof for corporations. Specifically, I argue that the normative demand for legal innocence is sufficiently met by the availability of a due diligence defence; that the responsibility of corporations when prohibited harms occur is properly a form of outcome-responsibility; and that taking into account issues of reciprocity, legitimacy and power reverse onus offences justly allocate the burden of proof in the case of corporate defendants.     

Intimate yet dysfunctional? The relationship between governance and conflict resolution in India and the European Union

The rise of India and the EU as global actors has sparked growing interest in their peace-building approaches. This paper compares the objectives and effects of the EU's and India's engagement in different conflict contexts within and alongside their borders. It examines whether their practices of conflict resolution or peace-building strive for more than conflict management or ‘governmentality’. This article asks whether there is sufficient consistency across either actors' governance interventions to even speak of a distinct ‘strategy’ or ‘governance culture’. It illustrates the close relationship between governance and conflict response initiatives but finds that the relationship is often dysfunctional.