Parties and Institutional Choice Revisited

Scholars of institutional change in Congress offer competing theoretical accounts of the accrual of procedural rights by House majority parties. One camp posits that the interests and capacities of political parties drive procedural change that affects agenda control. An alternative perspective offers a nonpartisan, median‐voter account. I explore these two accounts, survey challenges involved in testing them, and determine the fit of the accounts to the history of procedural change in the House. I find that no single perspective accounts best for the pattern of rule changes affecting agenda control and that the median‐voter model may be time‐bound to the twentieth century—after partisan majorities had constructed the core partisan procedural regime of the House.     

The Limits of Senatorial Courtesy

Because of senatorial courtesy, scholars typically assume that presidents defer to home state senators from their party when selecting judges for the federal courts. We challenge this view, arguing that presidents face structural incentives that encourage them to consult broadly with senators across the partisan and ideological spectrums in choosing nominees. Using new data on the fate of judicial vacancies on the federal district courts between 1947 and 1998, we show how institutional and political forces increase interested senators' leverage in choosing federal judges. Senatorial courtesy, we conclude, has its limits, given presidents' incentives to consult with institutionally empowered senators in selecting nominees.     

Putting Electronic Voting under the Microscope

Electronic voting entered the political arena some years ago, with some countries advocating its use, some countries trialling and then abandoning it and yet others preferring to preserve the status quo of paper‐and‐pencil voting within a voting booth. In this paper we present the pros and cons of electronic voting and propose a set of characteristics we think electronic voting systems should exhibit. We then briefly review some pertinent concerns, issues and worries. We conclude by introducing the Handivote system, an electronic voting system that supports voting by means of SMS messaging, and explain how it measures up in terms of our own specified characteristics.     

Out of the Hands of the Parties: Women's Legislative Recruitment at Westminster

At the next general election the percentage of women elected to the smaller House of Commons risks being lower than in the current parliament, where they constitute 22 percent of all MPs. The 2008–10 Speaker's Conference identified many of the barriers faced by women and other under‐represented groups and made a series of recommendations, only some of which have been introduced. The Government favours a voluntary approach to Recommendation 24, which calls for diversity data monitoring, whilst Recommendation 25 which calls for serious consideration of legislative quotas in the absence of a significant increase in the numbers of women in 2010, appears forgotten. A second Speaker's Conference should therefore be established; the issue of women's under‐representation should be taken up above the party level—with legislative quotas introduced to address the system level failure of democratic representation at Westminster.     

An Empirical Review of Family Group Conferencing in Juvenile Offenses

This study reports the results of an effect size analysis of the effectiveness of family group conferencing (FGC) on recidivism and satisfaction in juvenile offenses. Analyses were conducted on nine studies consisting of 2,880 juveniles. The average recidivism effect size for all studies showed no FGC treatment effect on recidivism. A total satisfaction effect size was calculated by the mean score of all satisfaction variables for victims, offenders, and supporters. The average total satisfaction effect size was moderate. The average effect size for satisfaction of victim, offender, and supporters was calculated for all satisfaction variables. The average total satisfaction effect size for victims was strong, moderate for offenders, and mild for parents and supporters. Between groups, comparisons were conducted to examine differences in overall satisfaction by participant group. While there were higher effect sizes for victims compared to supporters and offenders, there were no statistically significant differences between groups. Results find no support for the effectiveness of FGC in reducing recidivism. Results do show higher effect sizes for FGC in comparison to control groups in satisfaction with the criminal justice process. Recommendations for methodological improvements in future FGC research are discussed.     

Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence

Theoretical work assumes that legislators use ex ante design to gain bureaucratic influence, not only at an agency's appointment stage but also as an ongoing tactic. Yet no empirical work has investigated whether or not legislators prefer to use design to exert influence after an agency's appointment stage. Using a mail survey of more than 2,500 legislators, we model legislators' preferences for ex ante design as a function of both institutional factors and individual legislators' characteristics. Our results suggest that the feasibility of agency design as an ongoing tactic of bureaucratic influence is more limited than theoretical work indicates and that both institutional‐ and individual‐level factors explain legislators' preferences.