The ideological conditions for Khomeini's doctrine of government ∗

The Islamic movements and ideologies labelled ‘Fundamentalist’ share an oppositional stance to their respective governments rather than common doctrinal positions. The Islamisation of society and the state is planned on the model of the ‘original’ Islamic community of Muhammad and his immediate successors, but the interpretation of their principles in relation to modern socio-political contexts gives rise to political ideologies which represent marked departures from traditional Islamic doctrines and incorporate implicity or explicity modern political concepts. Khomeini's doctrine of government is an interesting example in that it is entirely based on traditional Shi'ite, premises and modes of reasoning and yet it reaches novel conclusions. It is argued that these conclusions presuppose the modern ideological notions of ‘the nation’ and the ‘nation-state’.     

The ‘Arab Spring’ in the historical perspectives of Middle East politics

Abstract

The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ appeared to be animated by slogans and objectives of universalist orientations to liberty, dignity and social justice, a departure from the ethno-religious nationalisms that dominated the politics of the region. They raised questions regarding the ‘exceptionalism’ of Arabs and Muslims, whom many observers and commentators considered to be tied to sentiments and solidarities of patrimonialism, tribe and religion. Yet, the forces that seemed to benefit from the transformations in Egypt and elsewhere were not those that made the ‘revolution’ but precisely religious and patriarchal parties which benefited from popular constituencies in elections. A consideration of the political history of the main countries concerned can throw some light on these transformations. The nationalist, often military, regimes which emerged from the independence struggles of mid-twentieth century headed ideological, populist, nationalist and ‘socialist’ movements and parties and authoritarian regimes which eliminated oppositional politics and social autonomies in favour of a corporatist welfare state. These regimes, facing economic and geo-political contingencies of the later decades were transformed into dynastic oligarchies and crony capitalism which broke the compact of welfare and subsidies leading to intensified impoverishment and repression of their populations. Popular strata were driven ever more into reliance on ‘survival units’ of kin and community, reinforcing communal and religious attachments at the expense of civic and associational life. These ties and sentiments come to the fore when the ruling dynasties are displaced, as in Iraq after the 2003 invasion or Egypt after the removal of Mubarak. The ideological and universalist politics of the revolutionaries appear to be swamped by those conservative affiliations.     

Syria's Forgotten First President Mohammad Ali al-Abed

The story of Syria's first president Mohammad Ali al-Abed is not told in Syrian history books, for a variety of reasons. One is the drama of Syrian history after 1936, when he stepped down. Another is the fact that he came to power with French blessing, making him an easy target for the National Bloc, which dominated Syrian public life from 1936 until 1958. When the Ba'athists came to power in 1963, they systematically excised entire sections of modern Syrian history; anything that came before the socialist revolution, they claimed, was capitalistic, imperialistic, elitist, backward, and ultimately wrong. Any praise of Abed, or his generation of Syrian nationalists, tended to result in harassment by the security services, or jail. As a result, four generations grew up in Ba'athist Syria knowing of no other president than Hafez al-Assad. This article tries to remedy this by shedding light on the career of a forgotten president from pre-Baath Syria.     

The Politics of Competitive Tendering: Political Orientation and Attitudes towards Contracting Out among Finnish Local Politicians

Using survey data on Finnish local politicians (n = 364) we examine the extent to which political orientation affects attitudes towards and perceptions of competitive tendering in social and health service provision. Expectation of cost benefits turns out to be the most important factor accounting for willingness to increase the usage of competitive tendering. The perceived positive impact of tendering on local democracy is also related to local politicians' readiness to implement reforms. However, political orientation does have a strong effect on politicians' perceptions. We also consider whether there are mitigating factors that could mask the relationship between political orientation and attitudes towards tendering. We identify one such factor, municipal employment: public-sector employees form a kind of informal ‘interest group’ resisting public-sector reforms in municipal decision making. In general, our results suggest that macro-level studies on competitive tendering underestimate the effects of political ideology on local decision making.     

Public–Private Partnership (PPP) as an Interdependent Form (I-Form) Organization

As “public–private partnership” (PPP) is becoming a popular model among states, the debate concerning how to make it more successful is accelerating. Based on insights from contemporary organization theory (OT), the present article suggests that instead of taking PPP as “partnership” between private and public sector partners, it is rather more beneficial to construe it as inter-dependent form (I-Form) organization. Subsequently, it identifies three types of interdependencies, faced by PPP-based I-Form organizations, and furnishes a model—comprising of initial and external conditions, and interplay of internal factors—that could enable smooth functioning and performance of I-Form organization.     

Interfaith Dialogue and Faith-Based Social Activism in a State of Emergency: <Emphasis Type="Italic">laïcité</Emphasis> and the Crisis of Religion in France

A significant body of literature demonstrates that the discourse of laïcité has become steadily more politicised in recent years (Gidley and Renton 2017; Hajjat and Mohammed, 2016). A series of value-laden discursive constructs have come to be coupled with the normative rulings of secularism (Kahn 2007). This has led to an omerta around Islamophobia in the French political sphere. Based on 20 months (October 2015–May 2017) of ethnographic research in the tense context of Parisian civil society due to austerity and insecurity, this paper shows how interfaith initiatives and faith-based social action figure into a new landscape of state-enforced values under a state of emergency, where one religion in particular is under scrutiny. The first argument is that while interfaith education and outreach are dialogical vectors for combating discrimination, they are constrained by the discourse of laïcité and the implicit targeting of Muslims in the state of emergency (état d’urgence). Seldom explicit, the approach to dialogue between religions of many of these interfaith associations--voluntary organisations--lack a critique of laïcité and its epistemological correlation to anti-clericalism. By contrast, faith-based social action, and its inevitable multi-faith encounter, generates more personal understandings about discrimination. Therefore the second argument, is that it is through social action that the recognition of religious identity as a factor acting in favour of a shared secular-religious common good can come about.     

Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring

In a standard rent-seeking contest, players optimally employ resources in an attempt to obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some exogenous per-unit cost. In practice, these resources often consist of scarce, talented individuals. We model a rent-seeking contest with scarce talent and find that talent scarcity leads to preemptive hiring by the player receiving the larger rent. This player hires all available talent and wins the contest with probability 1. This is true even when the difference in rents is small.