Is Putin’s popularity real?

Vladimir Putin has managed to achieve strikingly high public approval ratings throughout his time as president and prime minister of Russia. But is his popularity real, or are respondents lying to pollsters? We conducted a series of list experiments in early 2015 to estimate support for Putin while allowing respondents to maintain ambiguity about whether they personally do so. Our estimates suggest support for Putin of approximately 80%, which is within 10 percentage points of that implied by direct questioning. We find little evidence that these estimates are positively biased due to the presence of floor effects. In contrast, our analysis of placebo experiments suggests that there may be a small negative bias due to artificial deflation. We conclude that Putin’s approval ratings largely reflect the attitudes of Russian citizens.     

Implications of Longevity Bias for Explaining,Evaluating, and Responding to Social Inequality

Social Justice Research - Longevity bias is the tendency to assume that longstanding states of the world are better and more right than their more recent (but otherwise identical) counterparts. In...     

Bringing Rigor to the Use of Evidence in Policy Making: Translating Early Evidence

Beyond the evidence provided by randomized controlled trials, there is a need for supplementing and contextualizing efficacy findings through early evidence. This may include evidence of program costs, quality implementation processes, and impact of programs on different groups. This article considers the Quality and Impact of Component Evidence Assessment and other exemplary efforts for translating early evidence for policy making within a common framework. This framework includes processes for strategic review, development of guiding standards on the quality of evidence, and active communication with policy makers.     

Espionage and the cold war: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban missile crisis

Oleg Penkovsky spied for SIS and the CIA during a crucial phase of the Cold War. Acclaimed as one of the most important spies of the century, his role in the Cuban missile crisis has been portrayed as of pre‐eminent importance to the outcome. Other historians have challenged this interpretation, while some believe that far from working for the West, Penkovsky was an instrument of Soviet strategic deception. This article draws upon CIA records and recent scholarship on the missile crisis to adjudicate on these various claims, and to show where, how and why much of the literature exaggerates and distorts Penkovsky's influence and importance. Avenues for further research are also identified.