Competition as Public Policy: a Review of Challenge Funding

Since their introduction in 1984 Challenge funds have been widely adopted by central government. They are now used by twelve government departments to distribute competitively more than £3,250 million of Exchequer funds. The introduction of Challenge funds appears to have been politically driven, usually focusing on the objectives of cost and efficiency rather than quality and equity. They represent a further manifestation of the introduction of competition and 'market style' structures. This paper examines the key features of 41 Challenge funds and their operational characteristics. Numerous benefits, such as cost savings and innovation, arising from the introduction of Challenge funds have been put forward. By reviewing other studies, which have investigated the impact of the introduction of competition in producer and consumer markets, and through comparison with previous schemes it is possible to examine the potential impact of Challenge funds. Administrative and monitoring mechanisms are found to be centralizing control, despite assertions to the contrary. There is a growing concern that the level of information collection required is too arduous and it is used to control and regulate schemes rather than as a method of investigating where operations could be improved. Leverage from Challenge funds has been no more successful than earlier non-competitive initiatives. Competitive bidding could stifle innovation and participatory democracy is not encouraged or facilitated by Challenge funds.     

Preventing Prevention

Preventing climate change and damage from natural disasters typically requires policies with up‐front costs that promise a flow of benefits over time. Why has obtaining such policies in a competitive electoral democracy proved so intractable? We develop a formal model of electoral accountability in this context, in which politicians have private information about their motivations. The model shows why fully rational voters, though certain that incumbents spend less on disaster prevention than is good for them, reelect incumbents at very high rates. In addition, in such equilibria, voters would punish incumbents who spent more on disaster prevention. This equilibrium is consistent with (and implies) some of the major empirical regularities observed in the literature on voting and disaster prevention. We discuss some implications of our analysis for advancing public debates about disaster and climate change mitigation.     

The lack of experimental research in criminology—evidence from Criminology and Justice Quarterly

Journal of Experimental Criminology - Despite experiments being termed the “gold standard,” criminology has been slow to adopt experimentation as a methodology. The goal of this...     

Mapping silent citizenship: how democratic theory hears citizens' silence and why it matters

Democratic theory hears silent citizenship as disengagement or disempowerment. Normatively, silent citizenship evokes the specter of civic passivity – of democratic citizens variably characterized by apathy, disaffection, selfishness, or a lack of political knowledge. Empirically, silent citizenship is linked to deficits of democracy – including voter turnout rates, the quality of political representation, and overall government responsiveness. One problem with these conclusions, however, is that we lack any systematic conceptualization of the range of different attitudes democratic citizens might hold in silence. This article seeks to fill in this conceptual gap by mapping the range of possible motivations for citizens to remain silent in developed liberal democratic systems. The key to doing so, I argue, is to distinguish between two measures of democratic citizenship: empowerment and communication. Separating these two measures reveals an entire spectrum of motivations for silence, which I organize into five distinct degrees of silent citizenship.     

Sentencing practices under the Arkansas sentencing guideline structure

In the last thirty years, research on differential sentencing practices became one of the dominant thrusts of academic interest in criminal justice studies. This was mainly because several reforms had been added to the various sentencing structures in the United States, one of which was the adoption of guideline based sentencing strategies. Although several studies were conducted regarding the impact of these guidelines, these were provided by a limited number of sources. For instance, the majority of this research was conducted on data collected by the United States Sentencing Commission and the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission. This study attempted to further the discussion on sentencing practices by examining data from a new source, the Arkansas Office of Courts. This study first examined the judge's decision to imprison and jail the defendant using logistic regression, and second, for those individuals incarcerated, OLS and negative binomial regression analyses were conducted to explore potential disparities in the length of prison and jail sentences. The results of this analysis in Arkansas illustrated striking comparisons to studies that were conducted on other guideline structures. The legally relevant variables were the greatest predictors of whether or not an offender was sentenced to prison. Extralegal variables, on the other hand, had negligible effects. Implications for policy are also discussed.     

The Teamsters, the White House, the Labor Department

This paper examines the instrumental networks established between organized criminals and national politicians. Its major focus centers on the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Department of Labor, and the Reagan Administration. We explore the organized crime influence that affected President Reagan's selection of Raymond Donovan as Secretary of Labor. The choice of Donovan resulted in several related investigations into Donovan's association with organized criminals primarily in the construction industry in New Jersey and New York. We explain and critique the investigations thereby establishing the instrumental quality of the networks and the politics of law enforcement. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Bringing Horses to Water? Overcoming Bad Relationships in the Pre-Negotiating Stage of Consensus Building

This article uses a case-study methodology to explore the impact of problematic relationships on the initiation of consensus-building efforts. The article notes that poor relations hinder the initiation process, while the expectation of benefits likely to result from the effort fosters the involvement of parties. The association between poor relations and expected benefits is explored with a focus on the appeal of collaboration. Strategies are then outlined to help facilitators to deal with problematic relationships by mitigating poor relations, highlighting incentives for participation, and building on the appeal of collaboration. Facilitators can use these strategies to increase their chances of success in initiating consensus-building efforts.