'Portrait of a profession revisited'

On the walls of my private office hang the photographs of my seven distinguished predecessors as Secretary of the Cabinet. I sometimes find myself staring at them for inspiration, not always successfully I admit. A week or two ago I found myself looking at the great Lord Bridges, Secretary of the Cabinet and War Cabinet from 1938 to 1946. I wondered what he would have made of it if in the space of a week one of his predecessors had published an article in The Spectator advertised as ‘The Descent of the Civil Servant’ and another had appeared on the Frost programme to reassure the world that the Service was still in good shape. Both predecessors, Lords Butler and Armstrong, I hasten to say, were acting in the most supportive spirit and spoke from what for all of us is a deeply shared view of the role of the Civil Service. But, staring at Bridges, I could see a bubble emerging from his mouth enquiring: what precisely is happening on your watch, Sir Richard?     

Capacity for Self-Control and Individuals' Interest in Exercising Self-Control

We identify and elaborate a conceptual distinction between capability for self-control and the desire to exercise it, and employ data from a city survey to explore the empirical viability of such a differentiation. Separate scales measuring ability and desire to exercise self-control both prove to be significant and moderately strong predictors of several measures of criminal/deviant behavior, showing independent, cumulative, and interactive relationships with each other. For some measures of crime/deviance, self-control capability is most effective when the individual's interest in exercising self-control is low but its effect is greatly reduced or eliminated when desire to exercise self-control desire is high. Combinations of capability for self-control and interest in exercising it prove to be particularly good predictors of the absolute level of misbehavior.     

Public Reason Liberalism and Sex‐Neutral Marriage A Response to Francis J. Beckwith

This article responds to an article by Francis J. Beckwith that argued that the consistent application of generic liberal principles requires that same‐sex marriage not be recognised in civil law. This response demonstrates that Beckwith's article contains a series of interpretative and substantive flaws that render his argument unsuccessful. These relate to a misinterpretation of core liberal principles and a sidestepping of the matter of undue bias against same‐sex partners. In correcting these flaws I tentatively propose a Voltairean argument in favour of same‐sex civil marriage for those citizens with moral qualms about same‐sex relationships derived from their reasonable comprehensive doctrine.