RACE,HOMICIDE SEVERITY,AND APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY: A CONSIDERATION OF THE BARNETT SCALE*

This study uses the Barnett scale of homicide severity to analyze the capital sentencing process in Kentucky. In his analysis of Georgia cases, Barnett found that whites were disproportionately the victims of homicides that the scale considered as most serious. This conclusion was cited as an explanation for racial disparity in capital sentencing. When the scale is applied to Kentucky data and the level of seriousness of the murder is controlled, however, we Jind that prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty in cases in which blacks killed whites and that juries were more likely to sentence to death blacks who killed whites.     

Panel data analysis in comparative politics: Linking method to theory

Abstract.  Re-analyzing a study of Garrett and Mitchell ('Globalization, government spending and taxation in the OECD', European Journal of Political Research 39(2) (2001): 145–177), this article addresses four potential sources of problems in panel data analyses with a lagged dependent variable and period and unit dummies (the de facto Beck-Katz standard). These are: absorption of cross-sectional variance by unit dummies, absorption of time-series variance by the lagged dependent variable and period dummies, mis-specification of the lag structure, and neglect of parameter slope heterogeneity. Based on this discussion, we suggest substantial changes of the estimation approach and the estimated model. Employing our preferred methodological stance, we demonstrate that Garrett and Mitchell's findings are not robust. Instead, we show that partisan politics and socioeconomic factors such as aging and unemployment as expected by theorists have a strong impact on the time-series and cross-sectional variance in government spending.     

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING WITH JUVENILE OFFENDERS

This study was designed to test whether or not juvenile subjects who were on probation and were under a court order to pay fines would show an increased rate of work when positive contingencies of reinforcement were used in the form of contingency contracts.