Fiscal consolidation under electoral risk

The European debt crisis has uncovered serious tension between democratic politics and market pressure in contemporary democracies. This tension arises when governments implement unpopular fiscal consolidation packages in order to raise their macroeconomic credibility among financial investors. Nonetheless, the dominant view in current research is that governments should not find it difficult to balance demands from voters and investors because the economic and political costs of fiscal consolidations are low. This would leave governments with sufficient room to promote fiscal consolidation according to their ideological agenda. This article re‐examines this proposition by studying how the risk of governments to be replaced in office affects the probability and timing of fiscal consolidation policies. The results show that governments associate significant electoral risk with consolidations because electorally vulnerable governments strategically avoid consolidations towards the end of the legislative term in order to minimise electoral punishment. Specifically, the predicted probability of consolidation decreases from 40 per cent after an election to 13 per cent towards the end of the term when the government's margin of victory is small. When the electoral margin is large, the probability of consolidation is roughly stable at around 35 per cent. Electoral concerns are the most important political determinant of consolidations, leaving only a minor role for ideological concerns. Governments, hence, find it more difficult to reconcile political and economic pressures on fiscal policy than previous, influential research implies. The results suggest that existing studies under‐estimate the electoral risk associated with consolidations because they ignore the strategic behaviour that is established in this analysis.     

LOCAL POLITICS AND VIOLENT CRIME IN U.S. CITIES*

Recent research has begun to examine the effects of politics on crime. However, few studies have considered how local political variation is likely to affect crime. Using insights from urban politics research, this paper develops and tests hypotheses regarding direct and conditional effects of local politics on violent crime in 958 cities in 1991. Results from negative binomial regression analyses show that violent crime rates vary by local political structures and the race of the mayor. In addition, the effects of structural factors such as poverty, unemployment, and female‐headed households on violent crime depend on local form of government and the number of unreformed local governmental structures. Implications for systemic social disorganization and institutional anomie theories are discussed.     

Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany

Abstract.  There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one's vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote. They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a coalition insurance strategy , but do not automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically.     

Taxing work

Abstract. This article examines the development of tax regimes across OECD countries in the latter part of the twentieth century. It gives particular emphasis to taxes on labour income. Taxes on labour income represent a major drain on private households. They have become the mainstay of many of these countries' public sector finances. Taxes on labour income rather than on capital appear to be the preferred instrument of finance for those economic and political interests that advocate and support a strong (and thereby expensive) welfare state. There is little 'free lunch' to be had in these welfare states; if anything, 'socialism in one class' seems to be the rule. Coordinated market economies tend to impose higher tax rates on labour because they have higher levels of wage coordination, their governments are more likely to be oriented to the left and their executives are relatively weak in relation to their legislatures.     

THE EFFECT OF SUPERMAXIMUM SECURITY PRISONS ON AGGREGATE LEVELS OF INSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE*

Supermax prisons have been advanced as means of controlling the “worst of the worst” and making prisons safer places to live and work. This research examined the effect of supermaxes on aggregate levels of violence in three prison systems using a multiple interrupted time series design. No support was found for the hypothesis that supermaxes reduce levels of inmate‐on‐inmate violence. Mixed support was found for the hypothesis that supermax increases staff safety: the implementation of a supermax had no effect on levels of inmate‐on‐staff assaults in Minnesota, temporarily increased staff injuries in Arizona, and reduced assaults against staff in Illinois.     

MASS COMPLIANCE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

When government policy decisions affect the general public, people may or may not comply. How and why compliance occurs is not well understood. Current research on compliance has several weaknesses: (1) it tends to focus on the behavior of public officials rather than on the general public; (2) it relies on static rather than dynamic models; and (3) it underestimates the impact of social groups on individual choices. The present analysis treats compliance as a dynamic process incorporating both social influence and individual calculation. We assume that primary groups (family, peers), social status, and a society's culture all play important roles in changing compliance over time.