An economic approach to social choice — II

There is a formal equivalence between games, societies, and economies. Lindahl equilibrium for a game or society corresponds to competitive equilibrium for the equivalent economy. Results on existence and optimality of competitive equilibrium thus apply to the theory of games and societies. The “core” for a game or society as derived by extension from the core of an economy is “too large” to be interesting. An example illustrates that the α-core may be disjoint from the set of Lindahl equilibria. However, if the power of coalitions to inflict negative externalities is suitably restricted, Lindahl equilibria must be in the α-core.     

Wrongfully Convicted: How the Dutch Deal with the Revision of Their “Miscarriages of Justice”

During most of the twentieth century the very existence of judicial errors was considered an awkward subject in the Dutch legal system. This article considers the change of attitude in recent years. In previous years there was a remarkable self-confidence within the criminal justice system (and in most of the scholarly writings) in doing things the ‘right way.’ After a few warnings from (only partly legally trained) scholars, who became interested in the functioning of the system, and moreover, after a few clear and undeniable cases of judicial error, there was a volte-face in the general feeling amongst both the public and the profession. It is the opinion of the authors that this shift in opinion is historically important. This article therefore intends to draw a picture of the current state of affairs in The Netherlands.