关于量刑建议的若干问题

量刑建议是检察机关在指控犯罪时就被告人应当判处的刑罚向人民法院提出的意见.量刑建议权本质上属于公诉权,同时,量刑建议也是检察机关履行审判监督职能的有效方式.检察机关提出量刑建议,有利于促进量刑公开、公正,保障司法公正,提高诉讼效率,加强审判监督,提高公诉人素质.从目前检察机关探索量刑建议的情况看,各地做法并不统一,因此,需要明确量刑建议的原则、适用范围、提出时机和形式、方法、内部审批和变更程序以及量刑问题的法庭审理程序等问题.     

公平配置医疗卫生资源应坚持的原则

党的十六届六中全会提出了我国卫生事业改革发展的基本原则、重大举措和目标任务,指明了医疗卫生改革的方向。为了在构建社会主义和谐社会的伟大进程中不断发展卫生事业,努力满足人民群众日益增长的医疗卫生服务需求,就必须公平配置医疗卫生资源,坚持以人为本,维护人民健康权益,坚持公平优先,公平与效率相统一,坚持政府主导与市场机制相结合,坚持以农村卫生工作为重点,坚持与经济发展水平相适应,分阶段实现卫生服务的目标。     

普法应侧重培养法律思维——从贪官忏悔“不懂法”谈公务员群体“五五”普法内容

据媒体报导,中组部干部监督局在分析违法犯罪的86名原领导干部的反省材料时发现,其中81.4%的人认为自己犯罪与不懂法有关。难道这是全民普法20年工作没做到位?“我不是很懂法,并不知道事后收人家钱是犯罪行为。”说这话的是安徽省委政法委原副书记、曾担任过铜陵市委书记、阜阳     

浅议大学新生在人际交往中的矛盾心理

大学新生在人际交往中存在多种矛盾心理,主要有强烈的交往需要与强烈的孤独感之间的矛盾,过分自尊与自卑的矛盾,传统与现代观念的矛盾,现实交往与虚拟交往心理的矛盾.     

Politiques publiques d'innovation régionale et compétitivité mondiale : une étude comparée Québec-Wallonie

Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyse public initiatives to stimulate regional innovation in Walloon region in Belgium and in the Province of Quebec. The empirical analysis relies on the competitive poles program in Walloon and on the ACCORD project (Action Concertée de Coopération Régionale de Développement) in Quebec. The comparison will allow discussing the implementation and regional embedding of these programs and will reveal the similarities and the differences between the structure, the organization and the deployment of these strategies in the various regions targeted.     

Party convergence and vote switching: Explaining mainstream party decline across Europe

How can one explain the significant vote losses of mainstream parties across Europe in recent years? In this article, it is argued that mainstream party convergence is an important determinant of the recent political and electoral volatility in European party systems. More specifically, it is hypothesised that as mainstream parties converge on the left-right scale, voters will switch from supporting a mainstream party to a non-mainstream party in the next election as they look for an alternative that better represents their ideological views. To test these theoretical expectations, data is combined from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the Manifestos Project for nearly 15,000 vote choices of individual voters in 30 elections in 16 West and East European countries from 2001 until 2013. The findings have important implications for understanding the recent rise of non-mainstream parties, the changing nature of party systems and the increasing complexity of cabinet formation across Europe.     

How interest groups influence public opinion: Arguments matter more than the sources

Through what mechanism do interest groups shape public opinion on concrete policies? In this article, three hypotheses are proposed that distinguish between the effect of the arguments conveyed by interest groups and the effect of interest groups as source cues. Two survey experiments on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIPP) and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change allow the testing of these hypotheses. The resulting evidence from several countries shows that, with respect to interest groups’ attempts at shaping public opinion, arguments matter more than their sources. This is so even when accounting for people's trust in the interest groups that serve as source cues and for people's level of information about a policy. The finding that interest groups affect public opinion via arguments rather than as source cues has implications for the literature on elite influence on public opinion and the normative evaluation of interest group activities.     

Worldmaking,Legal Education,and the Saga Comic Book Series

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - This article argues that to disrupt legal education in a radical sense, students need to become...     

Does counter-mobilization contain right-wing populist movements? Evidence from Germany

Right-wing populist (RWP) movements have been on the rise in Western democracies. Outside of party politics, such movements regularly organize demonstrations against political elites and minority groups. At the same time, civil society coalitions have mobilized against these movements. Yet we know little about the effect of counter-demonstrations on RWP protest activities. We derive competing theoretical expectations from previous work. On the one hand, counter-mobilization reduces mobilization because the original movement is less likely to achieve its goals (expected utility/costs). On the other hand, clashes and standoffs between opposing movements facilitate mobilization through polarization and anger (identity/emotions). We empirically analyze movement–countermovement dynamics using a new city-level event dataset on street protests by the German Pegida movement and its opponents. In our quantitative analysis, we investigate how counter-mobilization is associated with the onset of Pegida protests, their intensity in terms of participant numbers, and their demobilization. Counter-mobilization does not prevent protest onset, but large counter-demonstrations are associated with larger subsequent Pegida protests, and violence against Pegida supporters reduces the likelihood that they will stop protesting.