The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

Of legitimacy,legality and public affairs

This paper argues that legality is not enough and that sound public affairs underpins the legitimacy of a political system. It examines the impact of lost legitimacy on Tony Blair, President Bush and America's foreign policy. The author draws historical comparisons between Britain in the Middle East in the 1920s and the USA's problems today and suggests that the fundamental problem is the lack of legitimacy in the region's politics. The paper concludes by asserting that the legitimacy of the EU political system will be endangered while public understanding of its institutions remains limited. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications