The median voter model in public choice theory

The changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world. Early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter. This claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector. In the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory, but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether. The model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is. These latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model, appropriately applied.Pointing out that the model might not be valid under some circumstances in no way implies that the model is never valid. In fact, this paper has reviewed strong arguments, both empirical and theoretical, suggesting that the median voter model is a good approximation of demand aggregation in the public sector for many issues. One paper will not change the opinions of public choice theorists on the median voter model. But the argument given here is that there is a large amount of theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the median voter model as a good foundation for the development of the theory of public sector demand. Once the overly ambitious claims that have been made for the model are set aside, the median voter model is in a good position to provide a base for the development of a theory of political structure that is analogous to the theory of market structure in economics.     

Dead letters on a page? Civic agency and inclusive governance in neopatrimonialism

Neopatrimonialism has explanatory power regarding the limitations of post-war democratization because it considers the combination of formally-democratic institutions together with power relations based on patronage. Neopatrimonialism does not however explain why marginalized groups make political claims in such inhospitable climates, nor have their experiences of governance processes been adequately explored. This paper addresses this gap based on empirical research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, applying a framework of civic agency to elaborate the goals and capacities of civil society actors. Under what conditions can civic agency foster inclusive governance outcomes? The research found that perceptions of limited and ambiguous outcomes from engagement in governance processes encourage civil society organizations to have incrementalist goals and limit self-perceptions of capacity. Inclusive outcomes were nonetheless more likely with persistent intentions and actions. Transactional capacities based on ties to political actors rather than participatory capacities based on political mobilization were more likely to lead to inclusive governance outcomes.     

The crime control industry and the management of the surplus population

This essay examines what we are calling the ‘crime control industry’ and how the growth of such an industry relates to growing inequality and the need to ‘manage’ or ‘contain’ the ‘surplus population.’ Profits are a major moving force in this process, rather than the goal of reducing crime and suffering. An important component of this industry is the ‘prison industrial complex,’ one of the fastest growing industries in the U.S. Also included is a rapidly growing private security industry that includes private police and security guards, along with a growing supply of technology to aid in the ‘war on crime.’ Other components include drug testing companies, gated communities, and a booming gun industry. We conclude by outlining possible explanations for the growth of this industry.     

Challenges to traditional concepts of sovereignty

There are many forces abroad in the world that challenge established models and practices of state sovereignty. These include globalization and internalization, the emergence of new polities such as the European Union, the reconfiguration of world trade into gigantic trading blocs, the rise of the communications global village, destatism and privatization, regionalism, the merger mania among megacorporations, global environmental problems, and so forth. In addition, there are countries that exist but do not function, and those that function and, strictly speaking, do not exist. What context awaits future public servants as they prepare to make their greatest post‐graduation impact around eight years from acquiring their degree? This article examines trends and looks at the coming context of public service. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more?

If school boards represent the preferences of the median voter, referendums to approve school expenditures should not constrain school expenditures. If school boards would choose expenditures larger than the median voter’s preference, referendums that restrict voters to approving or disapproving a school board’s recommended expenditure level will result in expenditures larger than the median voter would prefer. However, Florida used a unique referendum system which guaranteed the median voter’s most preferred outcome. Using Florida education expenditures as a benchmark, the evidence suggests that spending was slightly higher in restricted choice referendum states than in Florida.     

Democrats, Dictators, and Cooperation: The Transformation of Argentine-Chilean Relations

This article explores how Argentina and Chile put aside a century-long rivalry to form a dynamic regional partnership in the years after 1984. Their experience suggests that interstate behavior is more complex than many theories admit. Cooperation increased during and after the Cold War, with severe and moderate debt burdens, between economic liberalizers and statists, and under authoritarian and democratic regimes. This study uses institutional analysis to argue that executives were the indispensable actors who combined institutionally focused incentives and the ability to forge cooperative agreements. Previous attempts between Argentina and Chile, as well as elsewhere on the continent, failed when weak executives in one or both countries could not sustain cooperation over domestic opposition. Two crucial points are Alfonsín's and Pinoches foundation-building agreements in 1984–85 and Menem's and Aylwin's deepening institutionalization of the relationship in 1990–91.