Factions matter: personal networks and the distribution of bank loans in China

This article begins by focusing on the distributive implications of factions, as conceptualized by past theorists. This article then operationalizes faction as a quantitative variable using some well-established assumptions about factions. A cross-section, time-series model is then used to test the impact of factions and the intensity of factional ties on the distribution of bank loans in reform era China. Two pairs of case studies are further used to illustrate the importance of factional ties in the allocation of scarce resources in the Chinese political system. The findings are unambiguous: factional ties with top leaders can bring substantial advantage in obtaining scarce resources in the system.     

Indictments, Myths, and Citizen Mobilization in Argentina: A Discourse Analysis

Most accounts of the turmoil that shook Argentina in 2001–2 focused on the harmful impact of the financial environment, imprudent policymaking, and institutional weaknesses. These explanations paid little attention to the cultural frames and cognitive patterns that underlie the connection between civil society and political society. Based on a discourse analysis of Internet forums and presidential speeches, this article argues that the Argentine crisis cannot be fully grasped without considering the link between collective behavior and ingrained conceptions of national identity. The analysis finds that national myths and definitional questions of national purpose are key factors in the way citizens behave in the context of an economic and political crisis.     

Determinants of political judgments: The joint influence of normative and heuristic rules of inference

Prior research on political judgment has been polarized, with one group emphasizing normative models of political inference and the other emphasizing heuristic models of political inference. In accordance with recent findings in psychology, this article is rooted in the assumption that both normative and heuristic criteria simultaneously influence political judgments. Furthermore, differences in the relative extent to which these two processes serve to determine political judgments are hypothesized to depend on the nature of the judgment task. Two kinds of political judgments are considered: judgments reflecting beliefs about the candidates' stands on the issues and judgments reflecting global evaluations of the candidates. The reported results confirm that (1) voters rely on both normative- and heuristic-based considerations when forming these judgments, and (2) the relative extent to which these criteria influence these judgments depends on the complexity of the judgment task.     

Adolescents' perceptions of the nature of their communication with parents

This study examines the effects of the age and sex of adolescent and the sex of parent upon adolescents' perceptions of the nature of their communication with each parent. Two hundred and ninety-six adolescents aged 13–17 years completed a communication schedule, rating 14 content areas along six process dimensions: frequency of conversation, initiator, levels of recognition of adolescents' opinion, self-disclosure, domination, and levels of satisfaction. Multivariate analyses of variance were conducted separately for each process dimension. Frequency ratings revealed that adolescent females of all ages reported talking more often with mothers than did adolescent males. Adolescent males, however, believed they talked more often than did females with fathers about interests, sexual issues, and general problems. Mothers were seen to initiate more conversations than fathers on a wide range of topics. Mothers were also perceived as more likely to recognize and accept the adolescents' opinions. Adolescent females believed they disclosed more to mothers than fathers, but males believed they disclosed equally to both parents. Males disclosed more to fathers than did females about their sexual or other problems, while females disclosed more often overall to their mothers than did males. Adolescent males were equally satisfied with their discussions with both parents, but females were more satisfied about conversations with mothers rather than fathers. In sum, the results suggest that mothers' more frequent initiation of discussions with their younger adolescents and their greater recognition of their opinions lead to older adolescents interacting more with mothers than fathers.Ph.D. in Social Psychology, University of Queensland. Her current interests are in the areas of marital and family communication, adolescence, and personal relationships.Ph.D. in Social Psychology, Australian National University, with research interests in adolescence, marital communication, and childless couples.     

Who’s afraid of penal populism? Technocracy and ‘the people’ in the sociology of punishment

Contemporary sociologists of punishment have criticized the rising incidence of incarceration and punitiveness across the Western world in recent decades. The concepts of populist punitiveness and penal populism have played a central role in their critiques of the burgeoning penal state. These concepts are frequently sustained by a doctrine of penal elitism, which delegates a limited right to politicians and ‘the people’ to shape institutions of punishment, favoring in their place the dominance of bureaucratic and professional elites. I argue that the technocratic inclinations of penal elitism are misguided on empirical, theoretical, and normative grounds. A commitment to democratic politics should make us wary of sidelining the public and their elected representatives in the politics of punishment. A brief discussion of Norway’s legal proceedings against Nazi collaborators in the mid-1940s and the introduction sentencing guidelines commissions in Minnesota in the 1980s shows – pace penal elitism – that professional elites may variously raise the banner of rehabilitationism or retributivism. While penal elitism may yield a few victorious battles against punitiveness, it will not win the war.     

Investigating the stationarity hypothesis of Gross Domestic Product per capita in Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent State countries: Evidence using Fourier based panel KPSS test

Using annual data from 1985 to 2016, the study conducts a robust panel stationarity analysis by accounting for cross‐sectional dependency, sharp breaks and gradual structural shifts for per capita Gross Domestic Product (PCGDP) of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries. The empirical finding reveals that PCGDP at different Fourier frequency and model structure (trend or constant) for both CEE and CIS countries are unit root process. Moreover, the PCGDP of CEE and CIS countries are nonmean reverting in the presence of cross‐sectional dependence and gradual structural shifts which previous studies using well‐known panel stationarity estimators fail to find. Policy insights are highlighted in the conclusion section.     

Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization

Influential recent scholarship assumes that authoritarian rulers act as perfect agents of economic elites, foreclosing the possibility that economic elites may at times prefer democracy absent a popular threat from below. Motivated by a puzzling set of democratic transitions, we relax this assumption and examine how elite uncertainty about dictatorship—a novel and generalizable causal mechanism impacting democratization—can induce elite support for democracy. We construct a noisy signaling model in which a potential autocrat attempts to convince economic elites that he will be a faithful partner should elites install him in power. The model generates clear predictions about how two major types of elite uncertainty—uncertainty in a potential autocratic successor's policies produced by variance in the pool of would‐be dictator types, and uncertainty in the truthfulness of policy promises made by potential autocratic successors—impact the likelihood of elite‐driven democratization. We demonstrate the model's plausibility in a series of cases of democratic transition.